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ABSTRACT 
 
In an effort to increase growth, employment and diversify farmer portfolios and 
exports in Liberia, the government is currently focused on opportunities in smallholder 
tree crops.  Smallholder cocoa has the potential to benefit a wide population of farmers 
by increasing income opportunities and adding to overall household food security.  
However, the government must contend with a chaotic buyer driven marketplace with 
limited access to financial and physical capital and relatively little incentive to enhance 
production capacity and ensure quality.  This research describes the characteristics of 
Liberian cocoa producing and marketing households in order to give context to 
smallholder marketing decisions during the 2006/07 cocoa season.  The research further 
identifies factors that affect the price formation of farmgate cocoa prices.  Liberian cocoa 
farmers are receiving limited price signals due to the institutional, market-level and 
infrastructure-oriented transactions costs that constitute a sizeable gap between farmgate 
and world prices. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been the location of numerous conflicts since the 1960’s, 
including a devastating internal conflict in Liberia that began in 1989 and lasted more 
than a decade.  Critical to the long-term success of development in Liberia are the 
interdependent needs for security, human rights and capacity building on an individual, 
institutional and societal level to encourage economic development and an enhanced 
quality of life.  Approximately 75% of the pre-war population of Liberia lived in rural 
areas (UNDP 2006).  Displacement during the conflict has led to situation where a 
majority of Liberians live in the urban areas, many with few economic opportunities.  
Therefore, improving livelihoods in the rural areas, where agriculture dominates, is 
paramount to attract displaced Liberians home.  However, policy formation and 
implementation is hampered as the country faces a sizable gap in reliable post-war 
information detailing the current status, opportunities and capacity of its rural populations 
and their agricultural means.   
Liberia faces numerous challenges as the country rebuilds.  Ranked 44 out of 50 
on the 2005 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) list of 
least developed countries, Liberia is rebounding from the largest decline in gross 
domestic product (GDP) (91%) in the world since World War II (UNCTAD 2005; 
Radelet 2007).  The task is immense as an estimated 85% of the population is 
unemployed, 80% is in poverty, and per capita GDP is $500 in purchasing power parity 
terms (CIA, 2007).   
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Collier and Hoeffler (2002) estimate the significant economic factors that 
contribute to the risk of conflict are the initial income level, the rate of economic growth, 
and the structure of export markets.  Hostilities ended in 2003, and Liberia has begun to 
address these economic risk factors.  One example is Liberia’s strategy to reinvigorate 
and diversify the agricultural sector (Liberian Ministry of Agriculture 2008), which 
constituted 77% of GDP in 2007 (Table 1)1.  The Government of Liberia aims to achieve 
this goal through financial and technical assistance to rehabilitate smallholder farms and 
increase production (Government of Liberia 2006).  Concurrently, the Government of 
Liberia is also seeking ways to increase market efficiency through partial or full 
liberalization of agricultural markets originally dominated by parastatals.  Tree crops, 
such as rubber, oil palm, cocoa and coffee, are of particular interest as they accounted for 
60% of total exports by value in 2007 (Table 1). 
Throughout the conflict, all export crops were adversely affected.  Once staples of 
the export market, timber and rubber were often cut down to produce charcoal or, as in 
the case with rubber, permanently damaged by “slaughter tapping” to support the conflict 
(Liberian Ministry of Agriculture 2008).  The United Nations issued sanctions on timber 
exports in 2003 to disable conflict funding from this source.  With continuing sanctions 
on timber, rubber exports accounted for 88% of total Liberian exports in 2005 and the 
second largest export, cocoa, accounted for 5.1% (Table 2).  Although rubber is Liberia’s 
dominant export, it provides relatively few opportunities for smallholders.  Rubber 
production for export has traditionally focused on large plantations leased to and operated 
                                                 
 
1Tables and Figures appear in Appendix 1. 
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by multinational corporations like Bridgestone Firestone2.  Despite the dominant position 
of the large rubber concessions, smallholder rubber producers persist.  At the time of this 
study (2006-2007), smallholder rubber producers had few marketing alternatives save for 
selling to the multinationals, located in buying centers, which essentially set their prices 
in line with Bridgestone Firestone.  On the production side, many smallholder rubber 
farms grown with unimproved germplasm, have reached the end of their productive life 
(Liberian Ministry of Agriculture 2008).  Expanding economic opportunities for 
smallholders with other tree crops, outside of employment associated with traditional 
concession arrangements or attempting to participate in a smallholder fringe market for 
the same monocultured commodity, for example cocoa, have the potential to diversify 
agricultural portfolios and increase food security. 
Cocoa has the potential to affect many Liberian smallholder farmers.  In fact, the 
Ministry of Agriculture estimates that there are approximately 18,500 workers on rubber 
plantations compared with the 40,000 households producing cocoa.  In addition, unlike 
monocultured rubber plantations, traditional intercropping of cocoa with food and other 
tree crops provides opportunities to diversify income and alleviate food insecurity faced 
by rural populations (Gockowski et al 2007).  Throughout the war, cocoa smallholders 
were among the rural populations that migrated toward Liberian urban centers, fled to 
neighboring countries, or were placed in UN sanctioned Internally Displaced Person 
(IDP) Camps.  With few opportunities to harvest and market cocoa during the conflict, 
                                                 
 
2Throughout Liberia’s various political regimes, the government has granted generous resource contracts 
with concession payments regimes slanted towards the multinational firms.  Concession policies have been 
less than favorable for taxation, resource preservation and local welfare. The Transitional Government of 
Liberia has renegotiated 16 resource contracts, including Firestone Rubber, canceled 27 forestry 
concessions, and left unchanged 52 that were in place during and before the conflict (Smillie 2007). 
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farms were abandoned to fallow.  Unlike the ‘slaughter tapped’ rubber, the current cocoa 
stock remains economically viable and farms could potentially recover since cocoa has an 
average productive lifespan that peaks around 30 to 35 years and subsequently produces 
for decades (Dand 1999).  Programs are underway to replace damaged and unmanaged 
cocoa stands with disease resistant and other improved varieties.  Unfortunately, farmers 
in Nimba, Lofa, and Bong counties remain in a domestic cocoa market with limited 
economic incentives (Pay-Bayee 2005).  The success of cocoa as a means of generating 
income for rural smallholder farmers hinges on the implementation of market reforms 
and enhanced production capacity.  An understanding of the household-specific, county 
and regional variables that contribute to cocoa marketing outcomes is required to 
differentiate Liberia from its neighbors and cocoa from other important tree crops as 
policymakers seek to raise Liberian farm household income. 
The conflict in Liberia partially liberalized the cocoa market.  Before the conflict, 
a government parastatal, the Liberian Produce and Marketing Corporation (LPMC), acted 
as the market avenue for farmers to export cocoa.  With the organization’s near demise 
during the conflict, its memberships in international organizations have been suspended, 
and farmers and investors alike have no means of remuneration of debts owed (Pay-
Bayee 2005).  Because of its inability to collect information throughout the conflict, 
Liberia lacks reliable information with which to judge the effects of this de facto 
liberalization.  Without improvement in infrastructural and institutional arrangements, 
coupled with high transportation and transaction costs, there is little incentive for 
investment throughout the marketing chain, especially in remote areas.  The government 
is looking to pursue a joint public-private arrangement, where the government serves as a 
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regulator, coordinator and facilitator without encroaching on private investment 
incentives (Liberian Ministry of Agriculture 2008).  However, the debate continues about 
whether to pursue this arrangement through a reorganization of the LMPC or to dismantle 
the organization completely (Wilcox and Pay-Bayee 2006). 
Although there are potential risks, the potential benefits from expanding 
smallholder production of cocoa and increasing the market efficiency of Liberia’s cocoa 
sector deserves attention.  The global cocoa market is volatile as demand grows and 
supply remains unstable due to cocoa diseases, lack of infrastructure, and political 
instability in producing countries.  In addition, the cocoa marketing chain is complex.  
Market margins may be driven by institutions and market forces that leave some farmers 
with low prices (Wilcox 2006).  Since the end of civil war in 2003, Liberian cocoa 
production has stagnated.  However, according to the rapid assessment survey done in 
Nimba County for the Sustainable Tree Crops Program, “income obtained from cocoa 
and coffee by smallholder farmers more than offsets income from other sources and 
accordingly serves as the best alternative to other related farming activities” (Kennedy 
2005, p. i).  
Numerous factors directly affect a farmer’s decisions to produce and market 
cocoa.  The ability to market cocoa in Liberia is impeded by infrastructural constraints, 
such as distance to the market, quality of roads, and access to transportation.  Villages 
farther from buying centers or villages located in remote areas have limited access to 
cocoa markets or markets are non-existent.  Farmers living in border towns often travel 
across the border to neighboring countries to sell cocoa in adjacent towns or more distant 
buying centers.  Problems with the marketing chain and identification of marketing 
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margins are exacerbated by arbitrage opportunities in currency markets and the 
uncertainty of downstream prices at the domestic port (e.g., Monrovia) or in neighboring 
countries.  Other problems include land tenure disputes, lack of access to credit, inputs, 
and information, as well as, lack of incentives to increase quality from current low levels. 
The world cocoa markets, from cocoa bean exporting to retail chocolate sales are 
dominated by multinational corporations.  However, Liberia faces numerous obstacles 
when attracting foreign investment to increase economic growth and export opportunities 
in the cocoa market.  Public debt, internal conflict and corruption create risk for 
investors.  Recently, the World Bank and the Government of Liberia have outlined a path 
to forgive or repay the $400 million dollars the government owes in obligations (World 
Bank 2007a).  Since the end of civil strife in 2003, Liberia has improved in controlling 
corruption by 15 percentage points3, but Liberia has a long way to go (World Bank 
2007b).  On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates a high degree of public sector 
corruption, Liberia had a score of 2.14 in 2007, compared to the United Kingdom (8.4) 
and the United States (7.2) (Transparency International 2007).  Even with gains against 
corruption, “once a country has experienced a civil war it is much more likely to see 
further conflict, so that even though peace is an improvement, risk levels do not return to 
their pre-conflict level.  Thus even once peace has returned, people may still wish to 
move more of their assets abroad” (Collier et al. 2003, p. 21). 
                                                 
 
3  Between 2003 and 2006, the World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator increased from 5% to 20%. 
4 The Transparency International Index is a combination of the World Bank Indicator and several other 
NGO and governmental rankings. Liberia ranks similarly to its West African neighbors, Côte d’Ivoire 
(2.1), Sierra Leone (2.1), and Guinea (1.9) ) (Transparency International, 2007) 
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Another constraint on smallholder cocoa farmers is the lack of formal banking 
institutions in Liberia.  Farmers without credit or savings opportunities will find 
alternative methods that may alter production and household decisions.  For example, 
farmers may be unable to reestablish cocoa farms without the initial capital to purchase 
improved varieties or inputs.  Farmers at the border may be able to purchase inputs from 
abroad, but constrained by exchange rates.  Further complicating the transparency of the 
cocoa marketing chain are the resulting effects from smuggling cocoa in order to access 
foreign currency.  Liberia does not share currency with any of its West African neighbors 
and thus access to locally available and internationally convertible currency (e.g., US 
dollar or CFA Franc) or simply locally available currency (Guinean Franc) is limited to 
gains made from rubber sales (transacted in US dollars) and cross border commodity 
trades (transacted in Guinean Franc, US Dollars or CFA Franc).  Foreign exchange is 
completed in road stalls, operating at unofficial parallel market rates that are inconsistent 
between currencies (e.g., USD to GF, GF to LD, USD to LD), with the preferable 
currency being US Dollars5.  In addition, credit is typically offered by Su-Sus (a group of 
businesspeople with internal lending schemes) or commodity brokers who may alter the 
effective price farmers receive for cocoa through implied interest.  The United Nations 
Development Program has implemented micro-credit and micro-grant operations in five 
counties, including the traditional cocoa producing centers of Nimba and Bong County, 
which may have lower interest rates than some of the traditional credit sources and 
facilitate smallholder growth (UNDP 2006). 
                                                 
 
5 Essential commodities and government services are priced in US Dollars, which continues to increase 
demand, in effect depreciating the Liberian Dollar (UNDP 2006). 
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As the government attempts to assess the immediate needs of a struggling rural 
economy, the cocoa markets remain chaotic and an essentially defunct cocoa marketing 
board (LPMC), which offers no services, still plays a marginal role.  Within the vacuum 
of information created by the conflict, is a lack of information about the current capacity 
of the rural cocoa producing household.  To move forward with the goals set by the 
Liberian government, a clear picture of current cocoa producing households, the cocoa 
marketing chain and the resulting market outcomes needs to be developed.  Little 
information exists on farmgate price determinants, factors that affect marketing margins, 
and how the Liberian cocoa market is integrated with the world market.  Such 
information could prove useful in determining the most effective policy avenues for 
increasing farmgate prices and farmer welfare.  This research builds and expands on 
earlier research done by Wilcox, English and Davies (2007). 
1.1. Objectives 
The objectives of this research were to 1) describe the characteristics of Liberian 
cocoa producing households, and 2) determine the factors that affect Liberian farmgate 
cocoa prices.   
1.2. Organization 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the world cocoa market, providing the 
background on the cocoa production-to-consumption process, marketing trends, and 
global demand and supply, with emphasis on the Liberian cocoa sector.  Chapter 3 
describes the methods and procedures used to develop and implement a baseline 
household survey.  The survey describes cocoa producing households, identifies factors 
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affecting the Liberian farmgate price and outlines a farmgate price determination model.  
Chapter 4 describes the results of the baseline survey and characteristics that may affect 
marketing decisions.  Chapter 5 discusses the price determination model results.  Chapter 
6 discusses the conclusions, implications and potential policy avenues that may be drawn 
from the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2. COCOA PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
2.1. Background 
The major cocoa producing countries in West Africa, including Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon, typically occupy 60% to 70% world market share (Table 
3).  Price differentials and porous borders have long supported illicit cross-border trading 
of cocoa between Liberia and its neighbors.  Recently, civil unrest (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire  
beginning in 2002) has altered cross border cocoa flows and likely inflated reported 
cocoa production, based on exports, in Guinea, Sierra Leone and potentially Liberia6.  
Despite its importance as a revenue source for smallholder farmers, current cocoa 
production in Liberia accounts for roughly 0.1% of global production (FAOSTAT 2007). 
Cocoa prices have been in overall decline since the 1989 global price shocks, 
resultant from high oil prices.  Since then, cocoa prices have increased since October 
2005 (ICCO 2007).  With higher prices, farmers have economic incentive to increase 
quantity of cocoa.  Concurrently, if premiums for quality also persist throughout the 
marketing chain, then quality may also rise.  If farmers feel the effects of world market 
price dynamics, they will have greater incentive to make short to medium run 
improvements.  These improvements can be made in production and post-harvest quality 
through improved management practices, planting hybrid varieties, and implementation 
of proper harvesting and post-harvesting methods.   
                                                 
 
6 Liberia’s neighbors, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone, produce 34.1%, 0.25% and 0.24% of the 
global supply respectively (Table 3). 
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Though cultivation and on-farm processing techniques differ from country to 
country, there are important production standards that need to be followed if the resultant 
cocoa is to be graded as fair average quality or higher (Dand 1999).  However, if price 
signals for higher quality are dampened by the market structure, farmers will not respond 
(Wilcox 2006).  For example, Ghanaian cocoa is sought after for its high quality, 
maintained through strict government oversight, and typically receives a premium on the 
world market.  Marketing innovations in Ghana have also been successful.  The farmer-
owned Kuapa Kokoo cooperative formed a partnership with the UK's Day Chocolate 
Company to sell Fair Trade chocolate made with cocoa beans purchased at Fair Trade 
prices (Tiffen 2002).  However, only 1% of the cooperative's cocoa bean sales from 
farmers who meet certification requirements receive higher prices.  The experience in 
Ghana is interesting because cocoa production and processing and the chocolate 
industries are highly compartmentalized after a significant restructuring in the 1990's 
(Fold 2001; Fold 2004).  The marketing chain from cocoa to chocolate rapidly 
consolidates from millions of smallholder cocoa producers to few global processors to a 
broad mix of end users, which has an effect on prices paid by the consumer and those 
received by the producer (ICCO 2007a).   
Cocoa production, quality and market outcomes are inexorably linked.  As Liberia 
attempts to reinvigorate and expand its cocoa sector, attention needs to be given to these 
factors to better understand the challenges, constraints and opportunities the sector faces.  
This chapter provides an overview of the cocoa industry from production and marketing 
to processing.  Examples from other cocoa producing countries are given to relate past 
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experiences, best practices and possible avenues for information and technology transfer 
to Liberian smallholder cocoa farmers. 
2.1.1. Agronomy 
A brief description of the agronomic conditions necessary to grow and harvest 
cocoa helps one understand the constraints faced by Liberian cocoa smallholder farmers.  
As a tropical and perennial tree crop, cocoa requires a high amount of humidity.  Cocoa is 
sensitive to total rainfall and shade, especially in its early years (Table 4).  The ICCO 
estimates that a typical smallholder cocoa farm in West Africa yields 650 kilograms per 
hectare per year (50,000 cocoa pods), impacting the cocoa producing household’s income 
by $2000 to $3000 USD a year (ICCO 2007b)7.  Cocoa yields in Liberia are not as high, 
with an estimate of 176 kilograms per hectare in 2006 (FAO 2008).  Increasing yields and 
expanding production of Liberian cocoa faces many challenges.  Pre-war attempts to use 
improved varieties from neighboring countries ended with mixed results, likely due to 
incompatibility of the seed stock with prevailing agro-ecological conditions in Liberia.  
Adoption of improved varieties by Liberian producers was limited (Weise and David 
2005).  In 2007, new varieties and husbandry practices to improve yields were starting to 
be introduced in Liberia through farmer field schools, but the impact has been limited by 
availability of plant stock, infrastructural constraints and lack of capital in the cocoa 
producing areas. 
                                                 
 
7 Assuming  the farm has at least 3 hectares, average yields, non-hybrid trees, and reasonable tax rates and 
with growing subsistence crops and other sources of income will raise the household income above $2 a 
day (ICCO 2007d) 
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Cocoa is a labor intensive crop that requires maintenance to limit the spread of 
disease and to ensure high yields and an opportunity to significantly contribute to 
household income.  Yields have been significantly impaired in Liberia, due to disease and 
pest pressure, but also limited household resources and the effects of cocoa farm 
abandonment during the war years.  Black Pod Disease8 and pod borers are serious 
threats to Liberian cocoa and the application of insecticide and fungicide, to curb these 
threats, is constrained by limited availability and prohibitively high cost (Weise and 
David 2005).  In an effort to promote environmentally-friendly farm management, the 
International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) recommends, in its ‘Best Known Practices 
Guide’, that farmers keep cocoa and shade trees well pruned and weeded, in addition to 
isolating and quickly disposing of infected trees to lessen the spreading of diseases and 
insects (ICCO 2008).  Other management strategies include the use of disease-resistant 
varieties, and the introduction of predatory insects (Wood and Lass 1985).  Limiting 
chemical use through frequent harvesting, improved sanitation and appropriate disposal 
of pod husks will reduce pests and diseases and may also allow the farmer to enhance 
household incomes by adding value through organic and fair-trade marketing 
opportunities (ICCO 2007d). 
Balancing Liberia’s dependency on forest resources for economic welfare with 
conservation of forest lands is important for the long-term stability of rural populations.  
For example, increasing biodiversity in cocoa agroforest may aid in disease and pest 
management.  Introducing improved varieties of cocoa can make smallholdings more 
                                                 
 
8 Black Pod Disease is the most common in West African cocoa producing countries destroying an 
estimated 44 percent of the global crop annually (Geene, Heijbroek, and Lagerwerf 2000). Losses in 
Liberia are estimated to be 42% of yields (Gockowski and Wilcox 2008). 
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productive.  Additionally, intercropping cocoa stands with food crops all may alleviate 
the need for further expansion into forest resources (Geene, Heijbroek, and Lagerwerf 
2000; Weise and David 2005, CIFOR 2005).  Cocoa is often intercropped with food 
crops (e.g. avocados, mangoes, plantains), timber or coffee crops for shade during the 
early years (ICCO 2007a).  Prior research in other West Africa countries indicates that an 
economic system of shade-grown cocoa can diversify the farmer's agricultural portfolio 
through the cultivation of other trees and crops.  This diversification provides farmers 
with potential non-cocoa streams of income and decreases reliance on a single crop 
(Gockowski et al 2007).  
Liberian cocoa farmers are having difficulty reaching the average West African 
yields since many farms were abandoned to bush, improperly managed or poorly 
established9.  These problems have resulted in cocoa trees being too dense, 
unmanageably tall, multi-stemmed and over shaded, often with inappropriate or no-value 
shade trees.  In many cases, replanting entire stands has been recommended by the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (Weise and David 2005).  The severity of 
these problems makes farmers less likely to improve or reestablish cocoa stands without 
incentive-laden marketing options and without outside assistance and short-term 
alternative sources of income as the cocoa agroforest complex reaches maturity. 
2.1.2. Quality 
Quality measures have a significant impact on cocoa marketability and may affect 
the prices received by farmers as well as those received by agents downstream.  Cocoa 
                                                 
 
9 For more in-depth and technical information on the lifecycle, plant selection, establishment, maintenance 
and health of cocoa, see Mossu (1992) and Wood and Lass (1985). 
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beans acquire their flavor and quality during the fermentation and drying processes.  In 
Ghana, fears of destabilizing the established quality premiums have led to opposition 
against liberalizing their cocoa market (Fold 2004).  In Nigeria, legislation was passed 
outlawing improper fermentation, mixing qualities of cocoa, and other malpractices in 
order to regain global competitiveness (Oredein 2007).  Liberian cocoa carries an origin 
discount on the world market, often ranging $200 to $330 per metric ton, due to the 
inability of exporters to access high quality cocoa.  While this market perception persists, 
there is little information about what post-harvest practices are commonly followed by 
Liberian cocoa farmers.  Therefore, more information is needed to ascertain the quality 
control practices of Liberian farmers, how they affect farmgate prices, in addition to how 
world price variability is transmitted to farmers. 
Fermentation practices vary by country, available resources, and expected returns 
by the farmers.  The ICCO (2008) recommends a period of five to seven days is for 
adequate fermentation.  Beans should reach a temperature of 50ºC during fermentation 
and should be turned once a day to allow for even fermentation and aeration.  There are 
four commonly used methods in West Africa, including box, basket, tray, and heap 
fermentation.  Depending on the method, the temperature and aeration of the beans will 
vary and, hence, determine differences in quality.   
Farmers in Ghana wait several days to open pods after being harvested from the 
trees, in effect speeding up the fermentation process.  In West Cameroon, fermentation is 
done on matted-floor trays10 that provide adequate aeration and save labor hours (Wood 
and Lass 1985).  This technology may have practical application in Liberia where 
                                                 
 
10The trays measure 0.9m x 0.6m x 13cm, and are stacked 12 to 14 trays high. 
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financial compensation is limited to hire labor from outside the household.  Typically, 
cocoa fermentation in Liberia is completed in heaps or baskets for two days to a week.  It 
is unlikely that temperature or aeration control is practiced, contributing to the poor 
quality of cocoa arriving at the port in Monrovia (Wilcox, English and Davies 2007).  
Amelioration of current fermentation practices is a potential starting point as the Liberian 
Ministry of Agriculture strives to improve international perceptions of Liberian cocoa.  
Improving farmers’ knowledge and application of best fermentation practices is being 
relayed to the farmers through farmer field schools.   
Drying methods also vary across countries, regions the resources and preferences 
of the cocoa producer.  The ICCO (2008) recommends drying under direct natural 
sunlight immediately after the fermentation period has ended and suggests turning the 
beans several times a day.  West African producers typically sun-dry beans on the ground 
using mats or concrete slabs for at least a week.  However, this method allows for free 
range animals and substrate to contaminate the beans.  In some countries, beans are 
spread on elevated trays, which are moved or rotated into the sunlight and covered under 
a retractable roof during heavy rains.  Properly dried cocoa will have a moisture content 
of 6 to 7% and will crack when rolled in hand (Wood and Lass 1985).  Well dried cocoa 
can be stored for long periods of time without rotting.  However, with little emphasis on 
proper drying techniques and the ambient humidity in tropical climates, cocoa only lasts a 
few days to a couple of weeks before moisture content climbs to unacceptable levels and 
the beans mold (Dand 1999).  
Proper drying is critical to prevent cocoa from molding during transportation.  
Cocoa exporters will take bean samples to determine moisture, detect mold or 
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germination, and estimate the proportions of broken, slaty or under- or over-fermented 
beans and foreign matter.  Cocoa buyers in the villages and buying centers often employ 
more rudimentary methods and focus on moisture content and percentage of foreign 
material.  Cocoa beans reabsorb moisture and smoky odors obtained through wood-oven 
drying, so great care is needed during drying and storage processes (Wood and Lass 
1985).  While some quality issues can be rectified through the grinding and roasting 
processes, moldy and smoky beans are always rejected (Dand 1999).  According to the 
ICCO, one long-term goal of the global cocoa industry is to improve quality control 
through educating farmers in quality control practices (ICCO 2008).  Educating farmers 
about quality control methods may enable them to command higher prices for better 
quality cocoa.  Maintaining quality and the identity of the origin of the beans, could also 
serve to establish accountability through the marketing chain while increasing the overall 
quality of cocoa globally (ICCO 2008). 
2.2. Global Demand  
Consumption of cocoa11 expanded by 571,000 metric tons (an increase of 21%) to 
2,719,048 metric tons between 1996/97 and 2004/05 with most of the increase from the 
cocoa consuming countries of Europe (ICCO 2007c).  The largest regional increases, on a 
percentage basis, were seen in the emerging markets of Asia (41%) and Africa (48%) 
(ICCO 2007c).  Overall, consumer demand for chocolate products is price sensitive 
because of the considerable range for substitution of ingredients and varieties of 
chocolates available (ICCO 2006).  Demand for cocoa can be measured by final 
                                                 
 
11 Calculated as grindings of cocoa beans plus net imports of cocoa products and of chocolate and chocolate 
products in beans equivalent (ICCO 2007c). 
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consumption, in the form of chocolate, as kilograms per person.  Another measure of 
demand, grindings, measures the processing capacity of a specific country (Dand 1999) 
12.  Switzerland and Belgium consume the highest amounts of chocolate products 
measured as final consumption (Table 5).   
Cocoa may find alternative avenues of demand growth in the Fair-Trade 
chocolate, origin-based marketing, and organic markets.  Liberia has the opportunity to 
take advantage of these niche markets, given their lack of dependence on chemical inputs 
(Wilcox and Pay-Bayee 2006).  However, these niche markets are highly segmented and 
the farmer may not benefit from the premiums found in these markets.  According to 
Abbott and Wilcox (2005), Fair Trade agreements strive to raise farmer income through 
institutional arrangements that are often achieved by setting a price floor to circumvent 
the traditional marketing chain.  Beyond the effects on farmgate prices, Fair Trade 
chocolate certification may offer greater transparency to labor conditions and conflict 
funding, which may have an impact on the incidence and duration of civil strife (Collier 
et al 2003; Global Witness 2007). 
Although concern over food safety and environmental damage has grown in the 
last few years in cocoa consuming countries, demand for organic and environmentally-
friendly cocoa products is estimated at less than 0.5% of total cocoa demand.  However, 
consumer demand is growing.  The retail market for organic chocolate products has seen 
increases in sales from US$171 million in 2002 to US$304 million in 2005 (ICCO 
2007c).  Integrating environmental conservation into the cocoa market may be difficult, 
                                                 
 
12 This measurement accounts for sales made in the country and does not weight for counties that are 
sought for their chocolates or account for other products mixed with the cocoa (Dand 1999). 
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since smallholder farmers are more likely to make decisions based on economic motives 
versus environmental and social concerns (ICCO 2007a).  However, if there is access to 
theses niche markets, farmers may be able to capitalize on higher premiums.  Organic, 
Fair-trade, single-origin, reduced sugar and dark and high cocoa-content chocolates 
command higher prices than other products, and in most cases require a premium for 
higher quality raw cocoa.   
In lower priced chocolate products, manufacturers may look for alternatives to 
higher priced cocoa butter.  Cocoa butter substitutes (CBSs) have been encroaching on 
the cocoa and chocolate markets.  These low cost alternatives are derived from other 
smallholder tree crops, like oil palm and shea nut.  The CBSs come in three forms; cocoa 
butter replacers, equivalents and improvers.  The CBSs typically have a higher melting 
point and may facilitate expansion of the industry into warmer climates and increase 
general smallholder opportunities.  However, the use of these substitutes is still debated.  
One study estimates a decrease in cocoa demand by 130,000 to 180,000 metric tons from 
the substitution of CBSs for cocoa butter.  Legislation was enacted in the European 
Union to limit the use of alternatives to 5% if the final product is to be considered 
chocolate.  Other countries are debating similar options (Geene, Heijbroek, and 
Lagerwerf 2000). 
Shifts in demand from emerging markets and upward trends in consumption in 
traditional markets coupled with elastic demand will elicit decreases in international 
supply stocks, higher raw cocoa prices, and a commensurate supply response.  This 
response may result in more smallholder farmers, traders and buyers entering the market, 
as well as increases in quantity supplied and possibly premiums for quality as countries 
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compete for market share.  The benefit from this supply response to Liberia’s smallholder 
cocoa farmers depends on the influences of the factors that determine farmgate prices and 
the avenues for growth encouraged by the market or the government. 
2.3. Global Supply 
This section details the cocoa marketing chain, working from the marketing of 
cocoa to the farmgate, to outline the global marketplace in which Liberia is competing to 
supply.  Over 66% of global cocoa production in 2004, originated in West Africa (Table 
3) (FAOSTAT 2007).  Cocoa is grown throughout the tropical regions of the world (e.g., 
Africa, Asia and South America) by an estimated 2.5 million smallholder farmers on 
plots that range in size from 2 to 5 hectares (ICCO 2007a).  Farmers typically receive at 
most 5% of the retail value of chocolate (Oxfam 2002).  This wide farm to retail price 
margin is driven by several factors including the complex nature of the marketing chain.  
The cocoa marketing chain is a primary concern of producing countries given the 
significant consolidation that has occurred in retail, manufacturing and processing sectors 
(Oxfam 2002).  In many countries multinational processors also serve as in-country 
exporters, transferring the cocoa beans with an internally set cost schedule.  The result is 
a buyer-driven marketing chain as the multinationals continue to create backward 
linkages that bring them closer to the farmgate.  Certainly, if consolidation does have an 
impact on competition, then the farm to retail price margin would likely widen further.  
This impacts smallholder incomes and on-farm decision making. 
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2.3.1. Cocoa Marketing 
In general, as cocoa beans pass downstream through the marketing chain (Figure 
1), ownership changes but form does not until the beans enter the domain of 
multinational processors.  Cocoa beans are transferred from smallholder farmers or 
plantations to intermediate buyers.  Depending on the marketing system operating in the 
country, the domestic trade may have multiple intermediate buyers.  These buyers may be 
agents for other buyers or for the multinational exporters located at the port.  As the 
cocoa transfers from the domestic to the international marketplace, the cocoa may or may 
not actually trade ownership, since exporters (e.g. ADM, Cargill) may also be processors.  
Alternatively, cocoa is transferred to trade houses, which operate as storage and 
processing facilities in the importing country.  These trade houses may add-value to the 
cocoa before selling the cocoa or processed cocoa to the chocolate manufacturing sector.   
Raw (whole bean) cocoa13 goes through a process commonly referred to as 
‘grindings’, where beans are roasted, de-hulled (resulting in ‘nibs’), blended, and then 
heated to produce liquor or 'cocoa mass'.  Cocoa mass is converted to cocoa butter or 
powder, defined as semi-finished products (Mossu 1992).  Processors transform cocoa 
inputs into finished products (e.g. chocolates, biscuits, soluble cocoa) or distribute semi-
finished products to the cosmetics and food manufacturing (e.g., biscuit/confectionary) 
industries.  These food manufacturing industries transform cocoa into chocolate by 
finishing, branding and selling the results directly to consumers.  The chocolate 
manufacturing industry is relatively concentrated, with the top ten chocolate 
                                                 
 
13 The ICCO (2007) categorizes whole beans as ‘fine flavor’, generally produced by the Criollo or 
Trinitario varieties with notable exceptions and ‘bulk’, grown from Forastero trees, which accounted for 
almost all of the cocoa traded in the last five decades. 
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manufacturers accounting for over 40% of global chocolate sales, estimated at US$68.1 
billion in 2005 (ICCO 2007d).  
Chocolate manufactures often rely on processing companies to prepare cocoa into 
materials that they can use.  The processing industry is considered the link between the 
production of cocoa beans and the manufacturing of chocolate.  Consolidation in 
processing has been driven by economies of scale in transport (since cocoa can be 
transported in bulk on container ships) and processing.  Three large companies, Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM), Barry Callebaut, and Cargill Incorporated, dominate the 
international cocoa processing sector (ICCO 2007d).  They process over 40% of the 
cocoa beans produced in the world (ICCO 2007d).  These three companies process, sell 
and deliver custom blends for use in chocolate and confectionary products, as well as 
market finished products directly to the consumer through subsidiary brands (ADM 2008; 
Cargill 2008; Barry Callebaut 2008).  
The backward marketing linkage fostered by the cocoa processors to ensure 
supply has created a situation where the world's largest cocoa processors are also the 
world's largest cocoa exporters.  Informal arrangements with the large multinationals in 
cocoa producing countries make distinguishing local exporters from the multinationals 
difficult.  This consolidation has a dual effect on farmgate prices and producer welfare.  
Multinational exporters, for example in Côte d’Ivoire , provide linkages upstream 
through financing and quality process training for farmers and farmer organizations, as 
well as sourcing some of its processing capabilities in-country (Oxfam 2002; Dorin 
2003).  Decreased opportunities for competition may push local exporters from the 
market and oligopsony practices could exert downward pressure on farmgate prices and 
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margins of those middlemen not connected directly to the exporter or their 
intermediaries.  
The domestic markets of cocoa producing countries are typically focused on the 
procurement and export of raw beans.  However, origin grindings (processing prior to 
export) have increased globally 31% (2000) to 1,301,000 metric tons or 36.6% (2005) of 
all grindings (ICCO 2007; Geene, Heijbroek, and Lagerwerf 2000).  Country of origin 
cocoa may benefit countries that acquire quality premiums for their cocoa on the global 
market (e.g. Ghana) or those that participate in single origin marketing (e.g. San Tome, 
Java).  However, with complexity of semi-finished product demand and strict sanitary 
controls in the consuming countries, these ventures may only be feasible for large scale 
processors located in-country (ICCO 2007d; Dand 1999).  Though domestic consumption 
of cocoa is limited in most cocoa producing countries, farmers may be able to benefit 
from marketing by-products of production and other value-adding opportunities.  
Opportunities include animal feed from the husks, soft drink flavoring, and alcohol 
distilled from the fermentation residue (ICCO 2007a).  
Many market forces are exerted at the farmgate level from downstream agents.  
Price differences between farmgate and world prices are often attributed to high transport 
costs, low domestic quality, marketing board influence, risk aversion, and exogenous 
influences like labor organization, supply stocks, weather and poor transition of world 
price fluctuations (Kherallah et al 2002; Townsend 1999; Fold 2001).  When monopsony 
or oligopsony practices exist among buyers, farmers are offered discounted prices and 
market information is of little use.  However, as the number of buyers increases, price 
and other market information may place limits on agents’ ability to exert market power 
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(Timmer, Falcon and Pearson 1983).  Another factor that may affect farmgate prices is 
the lack of proper storage capacity.  Farmers may be quick to enter the market to sell 
cocoa that has not been properly handled (e.g. fermented, dried, sorted) or stored (Geene, 
Heijbroek, and Lagerwerf 2000).  Farmers may also experience price discrimination 
when selling at the farmgate, instead of selling at a regional buying center where prices 
can be higher, but explicitly incur transportation costs (Fafchamps and Hill 2004). 
2.3.2. Liberalization 
One of the objectives of the Washington Consensus was to encourage market 
liberalization.  The intended result of liberalization included increased economic growth, 
improved market transparency/efficiency, and the transmission of market-based price 
signals.  These objectives can be addressed through the removal of market distortions, 
decreasing inefficient state intervention, addressing production incentives, and 
developing competitive local markets in an effort to increase smallholder farmer incomes 
and consumer welfare (Townsend 1999; Kherallah et al. 2002).  As part of the colonial 
legacy of the major African cocoa producing countries, governments frequently 
intervened in the cocoa marketing chain to stabilize prices and collect tax revenue 
(Gilbert, 1997; Townsend 1999; Gibbon and Pointe 2005).  The attractiveness of 
commodity marketing boards14 has decreased with the downfall of centrally planned 
economies, the increased debt burden of developing countries, and the successes of 
market reforms in China and Chile (Akiyama et al. 2003).  A historical perspective of 
                                                 
 
14 Market liberalization has also been encouraged through the progress of structural reforms mandated by 
the 1989 Washington Consensus and the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (World Bank 1981; Gibbon and 
Pointe 2005). 
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various countries and the effects of market liberalization will aid in the discussion about 
the potential effects of liberalizing Liberia’s marketing chain.  
Nigeria was first to fully liberalize its cocoa market by abolishing its marketing 
board in 1986 through a rapid Monday-to-Monday change.  The market floundered in a 
vacuum taking many years to readjust (Geene, Heijbroek, and Lagerwerf 2000).  The 
intention of liberalizing the market was to allow anyone to export cocoa.  However, 
market liberalization occurred without liberalizing the currency markets, creating 
arbitrage problems.  The price of cocoa was bid up with an inflated Nira to access foreign 
exchange, and the cocoa market fell into disarray.  Prior to liberalization, quality 
premiums accrued to Nigerian cocoa.  With the rapid increase and subsequent collapse in 
the number of exporters brought on by inflated prices, Nigeria’s quality incentives were 
lost (Gilbert 1997).  Vestiges of the former marketing chain still persist in the form of 
private 'licensed buying agents' (LBA's) and brokers that serve to bring buyers and sellers 
together.  Nigeria is trying to regain the high quality premiums it once enjoyed through 
new legislation that requires grading and quality protocols at local buying centers to 
promote a higher quality cocoa (Gilbert 1997; Oredein 2007).  
In the early 1990’s, liberalization in Cameroon was also meant to eliminate direct 
governmental market intervention, open the market to private exporting interests and 
decrease barriers to entry.  Post-liberalization market organization in Cameroon is similar 
to Nigeria in the Anglophone Southwest Province but is slightly different in the 
Francophone Central and South Provinces as smallholders selling to village-level farmer 
groups ("groupe d'initiative commune" or GIC's), coxeurs (independent middlemen), or 
caissiers (contracted by the traders).  From these intermediaries, cocoa is transferred to 
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larger traders, residing in or near larger regional buying centers.  These regional buyers 
often have direct contracts with exporters and local processors and (Figure 1).  The 
liberalization process increased the number of exporters in the short-term, but during the 
2004/05 season, consolidation and cooperation with multinational firms allowed Cargill 
and ADM to drive the export market (Wilcox 2006).  Post-liberalization, market access is 
still challenging for those producers and buyers who are not connected through political, 
farmer organization or exporter linkages (Wilcox 2006).  
Prior to reforms the Caisse de Stabilisation (CAISTAB) was the government run 
parastatal in Côte d’Ivoire.  CAISTAB stabilized prices through setting export prices, 
determining domestic transportation costs and farmgate prices, excising some quality 
control, and directly purchasing and selling cocoa without taking physical possession of 
the beans (Gilbert 1997).  Starting reforms during the 1991/92 season, Côte d’Ivoire 
implemented an auction based system in which exporters bid for export rights.  
CAISTAB was formally abolished in 1999 and replaced by separately controlled entities 
with government oversight.  These entities are the Regulatory and Control Fund (FRC) 
price support mechanism and the Coffee and Cocoa Producers' Fund (FDPCC) which 
gives farmers tools and training, Regulatory Authority for Coffee and Cocoa (ARCC), the 
cocoa marketing and export industry (Bourse du Café et du Cacao (BCC)) and an 
organization representing farmer cooperatives (GVC).  Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s 
largest cocoa producer, therefore, global price fluctuations have a large impact on 
smallholder cocoa farmers.  The ARCC provides the market with a suggested price floor, 
in the form of a declared representative price, but this is not enforced and widely flouted 
by downstream agents.  
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Since liberalization and the decrease in government influence in Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Nigeria, farmgate prices tend to follow international price movements 
closer than during the pre-reform period (Gilbert and Varangis 2003).  The two largest 
cocoa producers, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (Ghana’s domestic market is not-liberalized), 
receive between 45-60% of the ICCO price15 due to government intervention through 
direct and indirect taxation.  Nigeria and Cameroon, who liberalized in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, have more competitive markets resulting in farmers receiving upwards of 
80% of the LIFFE price (Figure 2). 
2.4. Liberian Cocoa Market  
Liberia is considered a small exporting country and war essentially created a de 
facto liberalized market in Liberia.  Yet, in comparison to other West African cocoa 
producing countries whose markets have undergone liberalization, Liberia receives a 
smaller fraction of the ICCO price.  Part of this is difference is driven by the fact that 
Liberian cocoa commands a discounted price on the world market because of generally 
poor quality.  Various aspects of the supply chain and their effects on farmgate prices are 
discussed in this section.  Supply-chain constraints that affect Liberia’s cocoa market are 
emphasized. 
In Liberia, the external (Monrovia to international port) and internal (farm to port) 
price margins are sizable, especially in comparison with other West African countries 
(Figure 2).  Domestically, for example, Nigeria has similar infrastructural constraints 
(e.g. poor road quality), but overall marketing margins are small as noted by the 
                                                 
 
15 The ICCO price is a composite price for cocoa on the London (LIFFE) and New York futures markets. 
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difference between the farmgate and port price.  This is not likely the case in Liberia.  
Though the Monrovia (port) price was not known in the given timeframe, one can 
reasonably assume that the external margins (not counting origin discounts) are 
somewhat similar between Nigerian and Liberia as these are accounted for in general, by 
transactions costs that intervene between f.o.b. (Freight on Board) and c.i.f. (Cost, 
Insurance, Freight).Therefore, the large margin between the Liberian farmgate and the 
LIFFE price is likely of domestic origin.  This is may be exacerbated by scale.  During 
the 2006/07 season Liberia exported 392 metric tons of cocoa to the European Union 
(EU27), which is 35% less than what Nigeria exported to the EU27 in the month of 
September of that season (EUROSTAT 2008).  Thus with such limited throughput, 
Liberia is currently unable to generate significant interest from world market and 
exporters are forced to develop markets with limited capital and insufficient scale to 
capture scale economies.  
Counterintuitive to most agricultural products, cocoa prices are typically lower at 
the beginning of the season (Figure 2).  In most countries, prices increase at the farmgate 
result from competition for the supply of cocoa beans.  Prices are typically lower at the 
beginning of the season, because cocoa is just starting to be harvested in relatively low 
quantities and heavy rains concurrently hinder the drying process resulting in low quality 
and limit the buyer’s access to the farmgate.  Prices tend to increase as buyers enter and 
quantities rise (lowering search costs) and continue toward the end of the season when 
supply of main crop beans decreases and the market shifts to mid-crop beans which are 
generally smaller and less desirable.  Harvesting of the Liberian main crop usually 
commences in September and lasts until mid-February.  The mid-crop is relatively 
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insignificant with little harvested between March and August when, accordingly, the 
market is almost non-existent.  
Historically, the cocoa trade in Liberia has relied heavily on cross-border 
transactions, primarily with Côte d’Ivoire, due to the potential for higher prices in 
neighboring countries and political instability driving trade flows within the West African 
region.  Given the instability in Côte d’Ivoire, stemming from the 2002 civil war and 
subsequent division of the country, Liberian cocoa has recently been used as a means of 
obtaining foreign exchange and foodstuffs from neighboring Guinea.  With limited 
information on the ‘street’ exchange rates among the Guinean Franc (GF), Liberian 
Dollar (LD) and US Dollar (USD), estimating an accurate price for the cocoa traded in 
Guinea is severely hindered.  Liberian cocoa is traded in Guinea in GF then converted 
into bags of rice, durables (e.g. household goods, farm tools, fuel) or USD.  Upon return 
to Liberia, rice is sold in LD or consumed by the household.  
2.4.1. Marketing Chain  
Prior to the end of the war in 2003, there were estimates of 19,520 16(Table 6) 
smallholder cocoa households throughout Liberia, with the largest populations in Bong 
and Nimba Counties, or 13% of all agricultural households (FAO/MOA 2001).  In 2008, 
the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that 40,000 households, including those in Lofa 
County, produce cocoa (Liberian Ministry of Agriculture 2008).  Many farmers lack 
incentive to participate in the cocoa marketing chain due to low prices and difficult 
constraints.  Smallholder cocoa farmers in Liberia are hindered by a deficient 
                                                 
 
16 This number does not include estimates from Lofa County, as the data was unavailable due to the 
displacement of the population during wartime. 
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transportation structure, lack of knowledge concerning prices and quality standards, 
limited credit resources, and inadequate legal protection from corruption and fraud (Pay-
Bayee 2005).  In theory, quality grades and price information are announced in English 
and local languages via radio, newspaper and information sheets where available.  
However, with no ability to appeal grades and limited knowledge and methods of quality 
testing, farmers are at the whim of buyers (Pay-Bayee 2005).  Impeding the marketing 
chain further is that Liberian cocoa shipped to the global market is discounted by 20% for 
poor quality17 (Gockowski 2007).  In the 2005/06 season, farmers received on average, 
17 US cents per kilogram, or 25% of the world cocoa price (Pay-Bayee 2005).  
In 1990, the near demise of the LPMC and the suspension of Liberia’s 
membership with the International Cocoa Organization caused the consolidation of 
Liberia’s cocoa export markets into five foreign exporters, each with several agent/buyers 
and subagents (Pay-Bayee 2005).  During its tenure, the LPMC accumulated large debts 
to the membership organizations and to farmers in the form of weigh bills.  The extent of 
this debt and the civil war crippled the organization’s ability to operate as it once had.  At 
the time of this study, the LPMC had nominal authority to register exporters, establish 
grades, and provide access to export facilities.  
Generally, the Liberian market follows Figure 3.  Farmers sell (partially) dried 
and fermented beans to any available buyer who approaches them or they head-carry the 
load to a nearby buying center for sale.  At the farmgate, buyers may be agents for 
                                                 
 
17 There has only been one instance of grade one cocoa. Grade one cocoa has 7.5% moisture, less than 12% 
defective beans, less than 25% slated beans as well as less than 10% in other defects. It occurred in pre-war 
Nimba County (Pay-Bayee 2005). 
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local/regional traders who finance village-level sales in nearby regional buying centers18.  
Alternatively, the buyer could be a small intermediate village-level trader with limited 
personally financed capital.  These small-scale buyers may be in a position to take 
advantage of farmers’ immediate cash constraints by offering same day cash-on-hand for 
prices that are less than the prevailing farmgate price offered by buyer’s agents.  Small-
scale buyers may collect enough cocoa to make travel to Guinea worthwhile, or sell to 
larger-scale regional buyers.  Farmers may take the cocoa to the nearest buying center to 
capture the intermediary’s margin (after transport costs) and/or gain access to credit 
through informal arrangements directly with a larger-scale buyer.  Low overall 
production and has corresponded with a limited number of buyers, traders and exporters 
downstream.  This may encourage monopsony practices upstream at the farmgate as this 
market power, exacerbated by limited numbers of exporters resulting from market 
consolidation after liberalization, has been observed in other cocoa producing countries 
(Gilbert 1997; Wilcox and Abbott 2005).  Low national output and barriers to entry (e.g., 
adequate working capital) limit options for exporter recruitment.  Beyond exporting 
cocoa beans, the likelihood that Liberia can foster the development of a cocoa processing 
industry is low given the extremely limited domestic throughput and other factors that 
have plagued the successful pursuit of such ventures that have required state intervention 
in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
                                                 
 
18 Buying centers are defined by their size. A local center may be the closest city to the farm. Regional 
centers are typically larger with more defined marketplaces. Local centers filter cocoa into the larger 
regional centers. Regional buying-center buyers, on the other hand, benefit from economies of size by 
aggregating smallholder cocoa and transporting it on motorized vehicles to Monrovia, deep into Guinean 
territory, or possibly to the Guinean regional buying center (Nzérekoré) close to the Nimba border. 
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Buyers at the farmgate, not directly tied to an exporter (Liberian or Guinean), face 
substantial market uncertainty downstream.  For example, quality, supply, transportation 
access and costs all affect the buyer’s decision making.  Buyers may discount cocoa at 
the farmgate to capture more of the marketing margin.  Constrained by the lack of 
resources in general in Liberia, little mechanized transportation is available and it is 
relatively costly, even for buyers collecting cocoa.  Lastly, buyers transporting 
(smuggling) cocoa to Guinea also pay a “border fee” and additional costs associated with 
cocoa smuggling to avoid confiscation by the Liberian government. 
At the time of this study (2006/07), indications were that cocoa is not processed in 
Liberia or Guinea.  Therefore, raw cocoa sold in the domestic market eventually reaches 
the port in Monrovia or has been smuggled to the port in Conakry, Guinea.  Cocoa 
remaining in Liberia is transported by a regional trader to Monrovia for sale to one of the 
five exporters (as of 2005).  Prior to export, the cocoa at the Monrovia port is verified for 
shipment (e.g. properly dried, graded, and fumigated) through Bureau Veritas (BIVAC).  
During the time of the study, the LPMC additionally inspected the cocoa and provided 
drying and storage when the exporter was unable to provide these services.  Estimates of 
prices and collection, transportation and insurance costs were derived from interviews 
and secondary data (Table 7).  As discussed previously, there is a sizeable wedge 
between the farmgate price and the pre-entry price at the port.  The government, 
including the LPMC accounts for approximately 13% of the margin.  However, export 
taxes are only 2.5 of f.o.b. and serves as a much needed source of government funding.  
Buyers tend to receive approximately 47% of the f.o.b. price.  This buyer’s profit margin 
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is substantial; however, inefficiency and market power are potential issues as it accrues to 
several levels of intermediaries throughout the marketing chain.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
3.1. Methods for the Liberian Baseline Survey  
Data were obtained from a baseline survey conducted by the International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture’s Sustainable Tree Crop Program (STCP) and the 
University of Tennessee (UTK) during the 2006/07 cocoa season.  The survey instrument 
consisted of twelve sections: Locational Details, Household Characteristics, Household 
Demographics, Farming System Characteristics, Perennial Tree Crop Investments and 
Production, Hired Labor Use for Tree Crop Production, Tree Crop Marketing (cocoa, 
rubber, oil palm and coffee), Rural Services, and Rural Credit (Appendix B).  The 
baseline survey was augmented with a village-level survey to collect information in five 
categories: General Information (distance, population, and ethnic distribution), 
Infrastructure (electricity, road quality, and education), Cocoa Production (inputs 
available), Farmer Groups, and Possible Buyers (Appendix C).  
Enumerators from STCP and the Ministry of Agriculture interviewed participants 
between October 2006 and March 2007.  The enumerators completed 794 surveys in 40 
villages.  The villages were located around two buying centers in the counties of Bong, 
Lofa, and Nimba (Table 8 and Table 9).  The sampling methodology was impacted by the 
lack of village-level population and cocoa production data.  The survey targeted rural 
households with an emphasis on those that were producing cocoa.  Cocoa producing 
households were further divided by whether or not they were marketing their cocoa.   
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3.1.1. Selection of Counties, Buying Centers, and Villages 
The survey focused on the cocoa producing regions in Bong, Lofa and Nimba 
counties.  According to estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food and 
Agricultural Organization, these counties represented 85% of cocoa households for the 
country in 2001 (Table 6).  Additionally, Bong, Lofa and Nimba were chosen for the 
survey because STCP and their industry partners indicated that almost all the Liberian 
cocoa was grown there in the 2006/07 season with Nimba producing the most, and Bong 
producing the least amount of cocoa.  These counties continue to be the epicenter of 
cocoa production in Liberia.  Other counties (e.g. Grand Cape Mount) have completely 
abandoned cocoa smallholdings due to a lack of markets and price incentives.  
The regional buying centers were selected from a list of historically functioning 
cocoa buying centers, both prior and during the conflict.  In the past, LPMC warehouses 
were scattered across the countryside in larger towns and served as points of aggregation 
for rural markets prior to shipping from Monrovia.  With the near demise of LPMC, these 
traditional buying centers continue to serve as a base of operations for private Liberian-
based buyers.  These centers serve as focal points around which Liberian cocoa markets 
operate.  Unfortunately, the lack of cocoa production and marketing data does not allow 
particular buying centers to be easily stratified by throughput.  Instead, a preliminary list 
was assembled of potential buying centers in each of the three counties (Table 8)19.  Two 
buying centers were chosen per county with assistance from STCP, the Liberian Ministry 
of Agriculture and members of the Liberian cocoa industry.  These centers were 
                                                 
 
19 Several other buying centers were encountered in the field that are closely related to those in . In general, 
these other centers represent the exact location of a particular buyer who stores cocoa purchases in a town 
(village) adjacent to a traditional buying center (e.g. Bahn is a few kilometers from Saclepea). 
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considered to be representative of major and minor cocoa buying focal points.  When 
compiling the survey data, two additional locations were identified as being buying 
centers in Nimba County (Bahn and Sanequille).  Additionally, cocoa smuggled out of 
the country was more than likely passing through the towns of Ganta and Voinjama 
before being transported to Guinea.  
Administrative maps (1:150,000 scale) were used to develop a comprehensive list 
of villages within the anticipated buying center market area.  The market area was 
assumed to have a radius of 30-40 kilometers based on infrastructure quality and 
proximity to other buying centers.  When possible, cocoa buyers and farmers were asked 
to assist in the demarcation of market boundaries.  Any settlement name listed on the 
maps was considered a village.  Cartesian quadrants (originating from the buying center) 
were used to separate each buying center market into four regions.  One village was 
selected at random from each quadrant to create a sample of four villages.  A sample of 
six villages was desired per buying center (one village per day during a six-day 
workweek).  The remaining two villages were selected randomly from the master list of 
villages surrounding the buying center, regardless of quadrant.  The result was a sample 
of six villages randomly drawn from around each of the two buying centers in each of the 
three counties for a total of 40 villages (Table 9).  
The villages (Table 9) were visited before the scheduled surveying date to discuss 
the research agenda and logistics with village leaders.  This visit was done to enhance 
participation and to allay concern about ulterior motives.  The pre-visit meeting also 
allowed the research team to see the layout of the village and discuss the current cocoa 
marketing structure.  On several occasions, the selected villages were found to have been 
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destroyed or abandoned during the war or devoid of persons producing and marketing 
cocoa.  In these instances, the nearest village with cocoa farmers was chosen to replace 
the original village under the assumption that market institutions and production practices 
were likely similar given its close proximity to the original village. 
3.1.2. Selection of Survey Participants and Interviews 
Enumerators met with village leaders and assembled potential participants at a 
previously identified meeting place.  Most meetings occurred in the morning to limit the 
meeting’s impact on daily activities and assure maximum participation.  The meeting 
began with team members introducing themselves and explaining the research agenda in 
the appropriate language(s).  A village-level survey was completed with input from 
meeting participants.  Village leaders then developed lists of general audience members 
and cocoa farmers who were not in attendance.  Every effort was made to include all 
cocoa farmers in the village.  Each name on the list was assigned a number and survey 
participants were chosen randomly.  Since the focus of the survey was households 
engaged in marketing cocoa during the 2006/07 season, the enumerators surveyed ten 
cocoa farming households and six non-cocoa farming households, also chosen at random.  
Participants were randomly assigned to enumerators.  Enumerators conducted interviews 
individually or as a group depending on language constraints and the comfort level of 
participants.  Villages were visited twice, once at the beginning of the cocoa season 
(October/November) and once at the end (January/February/March) to facilitate the 
seasonal collection of transaction-level marketing information. 
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3.2. Household Description 
Data from the baseline survey for households that marketed cocoa in the 2006/07 
season were used to address Objective 1.  Of the 794 surveys collected, 337 indicated that 
the household had sold cocoa20.  This survey subset included farmers that responded with 
market transactions and had at least one cocoa stand.  Observations for those participants 
who sold but did not produce cocoa as their primary or secondary tree crop (5) were 
omitted from the dataset to describe the characteristics of the Liberian cocoa producing 
and marketing household.  Data on these households were collected to describe 
household characteristics, production methods and inputs that may affect farmers’ 
decisions and ability to grow and market cocoa. 
Anecdotal information on marketing channels, margins, and quality assessment 
was collected through in-person interviews with three buyers in Bong and Nimba buying 
centers.  Buyers were hesitant at first to discuss business matters, but after assurances that 
the researchers were neither buying nor competing in the market, they answered 
questions on their business practices.  Interviews were also conducted with border patrol 
stationed at the Lofa and Nimba/Guinea borders.  These interviews were arranged 
through STCP contacts while the researchers were in country.  
                                                 
 
20  Households sold at least once and at most 5 times throughout the season 
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3.3. Modeling Liberian Cocoa Price Determinants 
3.3.1. Data 
Data from the baseline survey for households that marketed cocoa in the main 
2006/07 season (from September to February) were used to address Objective 2.  Of the 
794 surveys collected, 337 indicated that the household had sold cocoa resulting in 563 
individual transactions.  After omitting sales for the previous 2005/06 main (5 sales) and 
mid-crop seasons (4 sales), and transactions with incomplete information (22 sales), the 
number of remaining sale transactions was 532.  These observations were used to 
determine the factors influencing the farmgate cocoa price in Liberia.  In order to 
delineate the affects of the world price on the farmgate price, the farmgate prices and 
discounts were converted from Liberian Dollars (LD) to US Dollars (USD) per kilogram.  
Prices were converted using the street market exchange rate, since it is the rate at which 
the marketplace operates, during the survey period of 60 LD per USD. 
3.3.1. Regression Model 
Factors that may affect the Liberian farmgate price received by farmers for cocoa 
are numerous.  Farmers make decisions based on expectations on price and profitability.  
The price transmission framework estimates the effects that market and institutional 
forces have on the marketing margins and the effective transmission of the world price to 
the farmgate (Wilcox 2006).  The difference between the international and farmgate 
prices is attributed not only to transportation and transaction costs (Townsend 1999) but 
also to factors that affect transmission of price signals.  Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin 
(2001) and Nkamleu and Kielland (2005) suggest that financial resources, physical 
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capital (assets and storage), human capital (education, experience, and family labor), 
social capital (dependents and membership in organizations) and distance affect 
marketing margins and production decisions for market participants.  Seasonal and 
locational variables affect the number of participants in the market and the prices 
received at the farmgate (Fafchamps et al. 2004).  The margin between the effective 
farmgate price (Pfi = Pi - PPKGi ) and the international price (Pw) can be explained 
through variables that represent the transportation costs(cf), market information (mir), 
farmer characteristics (fc), seasonality (s) and location (l) for each transaction i (Equation 
1):  
(1) Pfi = Pwi + cfi + miri  + fci  + si + li. 
The effective price is calculated by subtracting the magnitude (per kilogram) of the 
explicit discount ($/kg), discounted by the buyer for quality, quantity or other reasons, 
from the farmgate price.  These variables may impact marketing margins and thus the 
producer’s decision to harvest and market high-value export crops (Balat, Brambilla and 
Porto 2007).  Given the categories expressed in Equation 1, the effective price received 
by producers for sales transaction i was expressed as: 
(2) Pfi = β0 + β1*LIFFEi+ β2*QUALMATi + β3*TGDISTi + β4*TMDISTi + 
β5*QINVi + β6*TRANSPORTi + β7*BTRANSi + β8*BFARMi + β9*MKTINi + 
β10*OMRKTINi + β11*CELLi + β12*BCREDi + β13*NONBCREDi + 
β14*FAMSIZEi + β15*EDUCi + β16*CEXPi + β17*CHOLDi + β18*WETi + 
β19*BIGCTRi + β20*NIMBAi + β21*LOFAi + εi, 
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where definitions and expected signs for the variables are found in Table 10, Table 11, 
and Table 12;  βj (i=0…21) are parameters to be estimated, and ε is a random error term 
adjusted to normal distribution.  
The model was estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  To test for 
collinearity, variance inflation factors were calculated.  An index above ten would 
indicate that multicollinearity has biased the standard error of an estimated coefficient 
thereby causing the t-test to be unreliable in rejecting the null hypothesis.  The model was 
further tested for collinearity among the regressors through the analysis of the 
eigenvectors (SAS 2004).White’s test was used to test for heteroskedasticity.  Assuming 
an unknown form of heteroskedasticity the model was adjusted using the approximated 
jackknife procedure (Mackinnon and White 1985), which scales the squared residuals by 
(1-hi)2 , where hi is the ith column of the residual matrix.  This step down-weighs outliers 
with larger variances by further inflating ε i2.  Intuitively this method deemphasizes the 
outlier effect on standard errors.   
3.3.2. Variable Selection and Expected Signs 
Farmers may experience price volatility from price signals received upstream.  
However, institutional factors and marketing margins may impact the proportion of the 
world price they receive (Townsend 1999).  Cocoa demand is driven by the transmission 
of price signals through the marketing chain and the intermediaries.  After initially testing 
for the significance of β1, the model was tested for perfect price transmission.  If price 
transmission is perfect then the null hypothesis is that β1 = 1.  If the coefficient for β1 
does not equal 1 or 0, then there is a case of partial price transmission where transaction 
 42
costs and other factors affect prices received at the farmgate.  If farmers are receiving 
price signals from the world market, the world price (LIFFE) would likely have a 
positively correlated affect on the farmgate price.  The LIFFE price is the futures price 
that cocoa receives on the London Commodity Exchange.  The LIFFE price was 
calculated as a monthly average over each month of the cocoa season.  If quality 
discounts (QUALMAT), measured as a dummy variable, were taken for moldy or wet 
beans, they should have a negative impact (β2 < 0) on farmgate prices.  Buyers may try to 
lower their risk of lower upstream prices by buying low quality cocoa and requiring 
farmers to forfeit a quantity of cocoa (discount) for wet or moldy beans (Fairtrade 
Foundation 2002; Wilcox 2006).   
Barrett and Li (2002) suggest that when buyers or producers have trade flow 
information, or upstream price information at different locations, it results in market 
integration.  Integration may decrease imperfect information constraints on farmgate 
price outcomes.  Farmers and buyers indicated that, during the 2006/07 season, cocoa 
was mainly smuggled to Guinea for sale.  However, border enforcement, and proximity 
may have encouraged some to sell in Monrovia.  Thus two possible markets were 
available for Liberian cocoa producers.  If trade flows and market information were 
indicating better prices in Guinea, an increase in distance from Guinea (TGDIST) should 
decrease the farmgate price (β3 < 0) and as distance from Monrovia increases (TMDIST), 
the farmgate price should increase (β4 > 0) given the price differential between the two 
destinations.  Estimated as per kilometer costs, the distances from the village to the 
Guinean border (TGDIST) and to Monrovia (TMDIST) on marked and passable roads 
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delineated by ReliefWeb (2007) were used to measure the costs of transport to the two 
markets (Table 13). 
Quantity not only impacts the total price paid to farmers directly, but buyers may 
choose to limit search and transactions costs by amassing quantities in a target area that 
may have a larger cocoa crop or better road access.  Therefore, buyers may be willing to 
increase farmgate prices to benefit from economies of size.  As quantities sold increase, 
the procurement cost to the buyer per kilogram of cocoa should decrease, resulting in a 
smaller price margin relative to buyers who purchase smaller quantities.  QINV is the 
inverse of the total amount of cocoa sold in the transaction to estimate the effects of 
scale.  The expected sign is negative (β5 < 0) as the variable represents a cost, though the 
magnitude decays as quantities increase given the inverse function (Wilcox 2006).  
Fafchamps and Hill (2004) concluded that the likelihood of a farmer selling off-
farm increases with quantity and proximity to the regional markets.  Farmers that 
indicated ownership of a bicycle, or mechanized transportation were grouped into the 
dummy variable TRANSPORT.  Having access to transportation resources may decrease 
the opportunity costs of transporting cocoa to a local or regional buying center, therefore 
having a positive effect on price (β6 > 0).  Those farmers who choose to transport cocoa 
to the marketplace (BTRANS) may bear the transportation costs but positively (β7 > or < 
0) capture part of the margin consumed by intermediaries.  
Farmer groups (BFARM) organized at the village-level may provide farmers with 
resources such as bargaining power, collective marketing, or credit opportunities (Myers 
2004).  Value gained from participating in a farmer organization may positively impact 
the prices received (β8 > 0).This variable does not measure market information received 
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from the farmer groups, since only 1 respondent received this kind of information.  
However, the source and frequency of market information may positively affect a 
farmer’s ability to receive price signals and their ability to negotiate trades (Townsend 
1999; Kherallah et al. 2002).  The source of the information, government, newspaper or 
radio sources (MKTIN) may give the farmer a sense of downstream prices which may 
allow the farmer to better negotiate price (β9 > 0).  However, downstream price 
information may be irrelevant to local market negotiations, and therefore information 
from produce buyers and neighbors (OMRKTIN) may give the farmer a better sense of 
local market prices (β10 > 0).  Observations are compared to those who did not receive 
any market information (NOINFO).  Another source that may be used to gather price 
information is use of cell phones.  Farmers who own cell phones (CELL) may have the 
ability to obtain prices from buyers or sources of information not already captured (β11 > 
0). 
A farmer’s access to capital through credit may impact quantity and quality 
through production, purchasing of inputs, labor, or marketing (Oxfam 2002; Townsend 
1999).  Depending upon the source of credit, the effects on farmgate price may be 
positive or negative.  Credit is often extended by the buyers (BCRED) as a means to 
secure supplies.  Interest may be collected through lower farmgate prices at the time of 
the sale.  Given these reasons, BCRED is hypothesized to have a negative effect (β12 < 0).  
Other credit sources (NONBCRED) may not have the same affect on farmgate cocoa 
prices because repayment is not specifically tied to the sale of the cocoa, although money 
from the sale could be used to repay loans (β13 > 0).  These transactions are referenced to 
farmers who did not barrow from any source (NOCRED). 
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Farmer characteristics may have an impact on the farmer’s decisions to produce 
and market cocoa.  The immediate needs of the family (school fees, food, etc), access to 
social and human capital, and the lack of diversification in the farmer’s tree crop holdings 
may affect the farmer’s willingness to sell (Nkamleu and Kielland 2005).  Family size 
(FAMSIZE) may impact the household’s contribution to labor resources but negatively 
impact the farmer’s willingness to negotiate prices (β14 is ambiguous).  Education 
(EDUC) and experience in farming cocoa (CEXP) may provide a comparative advantage 
for a farmer, given that they may have previously experienced seasonal price trends or 
have cultivation knowledge (β15 > 0, β16 > 0).  Farmers unable to diversify crop holdings 
(CHOLD) may have fewer income alternatives and be more risk averse to haggling prices 
and possibly loosing a sale (β17 < 0).  
During the rainy season (WET), transportation costs may increase due to 
waterlogged routes as markets may become inaccessible due to the road conditions.  
Improperly harvested and dried cocoa leads to decreased quality, as well.  The wet season 
occurs during the beginning of the harvesting season in August and continues until mid 
October.  Cocoa harvested during the wet season can become available in the market 
during the dry season, which may increase supply and price margins.  However, the 
hypothesized effect of the wet season is negative (β18 < 0) on prices because of low 
quantities of poorly dried cocoa, relatively few buyers, poor road conditions, and high 
moisture content due to lack of sun drying opportunities. 
In previous studies (Wilcox, 2006; Wilcox and Abbott, 2006), buying centers 
were designated as “large” if cocoa was amassed for shipment directly to the port.  
Buyers in large centers presumably have relatively high capacity to procure and transport 
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large quantities of cocoa produced in the surrounding area.  Alternatively, “small” buying 
centers often pass cocoa through a second buying center before shipment to Monrovia.  
These small centers are typically in more remote areas where farms produce less cocoa 
and buyers have correspondingly lower buying capacity.  Proximity to the market may 
also affect the number of buyers visiting the farmgate and quality of the infrastructure 
(Fafchamps and Hill 2004).  Buying center size (BIGCTR) may be associated with scale 
economies, availability of market information, quality of infrastructure and a particular 
market environment driven by the institutional history of the market.  These prospects 
suggest larger buying center could influence the magnitude and variation of farmgate 
prices positively (β19 > 0). 
County factors may also impact prices for a multitude of reasons, including some 
unmeasured local level phenomenon.  During the conflict, fighting subsided earlier in 
Nimba County and communities appear to have recovered and are involved in agriculture 
(Pay-Bayee 2005).  Market access may be an issue in evacuating cocoa from a given 
county given the local infrastructure and attractiveness to buyers.  As long as cross-
border smuggling continues, Nimba County may have comparative advantage in sharing 
a large border with both Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea.  Other pre-war and non-descript 
factors may impact the current status of cocoa in these counties; for example, Lofa and 
Nimba were the top two counties for cocoa producing households in 2001 (Table 6).  The 
county dummy variables (LOFA (β20 < 0) and NIMBA (β21 > 0)) were calculated to 
compare these counties with the overall average of the survey, instead of a direct 
comparison between counties. 
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CHAPTER 4. SURVEY RESULTS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The characteristics of smallholder farmers and their households who are engaged 
in the production and marketing of cocoa (n=332), are described in this chapter.  These 
characteristics may impact household decisions to participate in certain agricultural and 
other economic activities.  Information about household size, education, income sources, 
labor, land tenure and inputs may have exogenous effects on the farmers’ decisions to 
produce and market cocoa.  The information in Section 4.6 is based on the sample of 
households that marketed cocoa during the 2006/07 season (n=337). 
4.1. Household Demographics 
The human capital of the household may affect many aspects of cocoa production 
and marketing from available labor force to ability to manage crops and from farmer's 
experience marketing cocoa to cash flow pressures.  Household size ranged from single 
adults living alone to extended families with up to 19 members.  The majority of 
households had 4-6 members (Figure 4).  Households consisted of the head of house, 
their spouse(s), offspring, and extended family, who may be related by blood or other 
familial ties.  Age, gender and experience of the head of household may impact the 
farmer’s ability to market or produce cocoa.  Heads of household were on average 47 
years old and 89% were male.  The average age of female heads of household was 51 
years.  The median level of cocoa farming experience for heads of household was 19 
years.  Roughly 53% of the household sample consisted of offspring, aged 3 to 20 years.  
Forty-three percent of these individuals were direct offspring of the head of household 
(Figure 5).  The age composition of the household could affect both production and 
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marketing decisions of the cocoa marketing household.  A cocoa farmer may choose to 
use youth to meet farm-labor demands (see Section 4.4), a high proportion of youth may 
increase pressure on the farmer to negotiate higher prices or settle for lower prices in 
times of sickness or starvation or produce more to pay for school fees (Nkamleu and 
Kielland 2006). 
Fafchamps and Hill (2004) note that farmers may travel to the larger towns not 
only to participate in the non-farmgate cocoa market but to gain access to medical or 
educational services for household members.  Therefore, having dependents in school 
may affect not only the spending habits of the household but change the marginal costs of 
transporting the cocoa to the market.  For example, the dependent may need school 
supplies or medical treatment available in the village or regional buying center.  Fourteen 
of the 39 villages surveyed had no schools located in the village, 24 had access to 
primary school, 1 had a secondary school, 1 had a technical school, and only 1 of the 
villages had both a primary and secondary school.  The vast majority of household 
members who were born before 1956 received no formal education.  At the time of this 
survey (2006/07), 39% of individuals aged 3 to 20 years indicated that they were 
students.  However, more than half of pre-school aged children and roughly 80% of 8-20 
year olds had participated in some level of formal education (Figure 6).  This age group is 
the one that was arguably most affected by the war as they were the primary source of 
soldiers, and schooling was intermittent throughout the conflict.  Uneducated farmers 
lack the production and business management skills that may be necessary to realize the 
potential of their farm enterprise (Wilcox and Pay-Bayee 2006).   
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More educated farmers may be better suited to learn new techniques in farm 
management, drying and fermentation, which affect quality and thus price and possibly 
negotiating prices.  Despite the current push for education, access to formal education 
beyond elementary school is limited for most rural households, even with regard to 
supplemental agricultural training.  Only three farmers indicated that they had received 
any formal agricultural training.  Of those, two had completed some training on cocoa 
production.21  
4.2. Income Sources and Crop Diversification 
Economic activities of household members are often determined by age and 
gender (Figure 7).  Not surprisingly, the primary activity for surveyed household 
members above the age of 14 was related to agriculture (66%) or school attendance 
(24%).  Thirty-eight percent of household income was derived from food crop sales and 
39% was derived from tree crop sales (Figure 8).  When looking at combinations of the 
important sources of income, 63% of respondents indicated that they received income 
from a combination of food and tree crops.  Although the sample is focused on 
households who marketed cocoa in 2006/07, 17% did not indicate that tree crops were 
considered as an important source of income.  Other less prominent sources of income 
included petty commerce (7.8%), non-agricultural enterprises (9%) and remittances 
(2.7%) from relatives in larger towns or living abroad. 
One aspect of cocoa production that aids farmers with household income is the 
capacity to diversify tree crop holdings.  During the 2006/07 season, many farmers 
                                                 
 
21 The baseline survey was not conducted in villages that STCP has implemented farmer field schools. 
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divided their land holdings among more than one perennial tree crop system (Figure 9).  
Additionally, farmers may have added food security through secondary crop production.  
Although approximately 54% farmed only cocoa, secondary food crops were often 
interspersed among the stand22.  Cocoa grown with other crops is an economic 
production system which diversifies the agricultural portfolio and contributes to overall 
household food security.  Species such as avocado, kola nut23, and plantain were 
commonly found along side cocoa on Liberian cocoa farms (Figure 10).  These crops can 
either be consumed by the household or sold at the market. 
Production and sale of food and tree crops generated approximately 77% of 
household income (Figure 8).  As with many West African nations, agricultural 
production is divided amongst female and male household participants, who in turn, may 
affect marketing and production decisions (Carr 2008).  Respondents were asked to rate 
the top three agricultural crops produced and sold by gender (Figure 11).  Eighty percent 
of male respondents reported that tree crops, specifically cocoa and rubber, were the most 
important product they produced.  This was in contrast to the 10% of females reporting a 
tree crop as one of the three most important crops they produced.  Female respondents 
identified a variety of food crops as being the most important agricultural products that 
they produced.  A majority of households (73%) had one field that was rotated with rice, 
cassava and mixed food crops.  Eleven households indicated they had no field in staple 
crops (Table 14).  Anecdotally, some farmers indicated higher opportunity costs (e.g. 
using limited labor hours for food or for tree crops) in the trade off between growing and 
                                                 
 
22 In contrast, rubber and oil palm were mostly monocultured. 
23 Kola nut is not a food crop per se but is sold in the marketplace for its cultural significance and has 
medicinal and stimulant properties. 
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maintaining cocoa versus food crops.  Opportunity costs for growing cocoa may impact 
the farmer’s willingness to transition from staple food production to cocoa, thus making it 
more difficult for Liberia to benefit from increased supply and economies of scale.  
However, diversifying overall household production by balancing higher-value export 
cocoa with staple crop farming was important. 
4.3. Agricultural Inputs 
With the limited resources available to producers in developing countries, the 
Liberian producer may have to decide between employing labor (which is readily 
available) and capital (which is scarce) intensive strategies (Cleaver and Donovan 1995).  
Liberian farmers are often unable to utilize agricultural inputs due to a lack of markets, 
prohibitive prices, and limited available capital.  The use of agricultural inputs in Liberia 
is rare, only one survey respondent had purchased any kind of chemical input (pesticide) 
for the household’s cocoa farm. 
Productivity of cocoa on Liberian farms is limited partly because of the age of the 
current tree stock.  As the civil war spread and subsided through the counties, 
displacement of cocoa farmers affected their ability to plant new tree stock.  Some 
villagers were able to hide in the bush close to their village and could access their farms 
throughout.  Others remained for years in refugee camps in other nations or internal 
displacements away from home.  Regardless of distance, this displacement caused many 
farmers to have varying access to their cocoa farms and those that did had few incentives 
to manage their farms because of uncertain futures and demand for food crops.  As such 
the prevalence of recently planted cocoa tree stocks reported in Figure 12 coincides with 
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the relative safety of the counties.  A majority of this tree stock is of the unimproved 
variety (Wilcox and Pay-Bayee 2006; Weise and David 2005).  Roughly 19% of the tree 
stock was under six years of age and was immature for harvest and 19% of the stock was 
already past its productive peak of 35 years.  The current status of the cocoa farms can be 
found in Figure 13.  Very few (3.6%) of the producing and marketing farmers had 
abandoned cocoa farms (12 farmers)24.  In contrast, 19% of non-marketing or producing 
cocoa farmers had abandoned their farms to fallow.  For the general survey participants, a 
majority indicated that they were planning on rehabilitating the current cocoa farm 
(Figure 14) (Wilcox, English and Davies 2007).  
Machetes, hoes and axes were all found in relative abundance (Table 15).  The 
majority of these tools were in fair to good condition.  Particular to harvesting and drying 
cocoa, 55% households had on average 1 cocoa harvesting pole and 55% had on average 
2 raffia drying mats.  In direct relation with the poor quality cocoa being produced by 
Liberian cocoa farmers, only 13% households reported having at least 1 fermentation 
basket and 13% households had on average 1 tarpaulin available for drying.  Finally, 23% 
of households had on average 2 jute bags, commonly used to transport prepared cocoa. 
4.4. Labor 
The household serves as a regular source of labor for Liberian farms.  Almost 
80% of labor used on the main tree crops was family labor (Figure 15).  Kuus are 
communal/rotational labor farming groups which help prepare and harvest farms.  Labor 
supply from the local Kuus was limited, and 6% of households (20), over all the counties, 
                                                 
 
24 These 12 farmers may not be managing their farms but still collecting cocoa from the trees.    
 53
indicated that they employed Kuu labor on their cocoa farms.  Monetary compensation is 
not common.  Rather, participants of the Kuu are often fed by the owner of the farm that 
they are working on that day.  One of the benefits of participating in the Kuu is having 
access to labor and being able to cultivate larger farms, however the Kuu’s services are 
limited to those who are able to ply their labor services. 
As in food crop production, cocoa production and harvesting tasks are often 
gender specific and age based (Carr 2008; Nkamleu and Kielland 2006).  Most often, 
once the cocoa is harvested from the trees by men, the pods are either broken en masse to 
collect the cocoa beans near the point of harvest or pods are carried back to the domicile 
by both sexes (Figure 16).  The cocoa beans are usually fermented and dried by women.  
In general, cocoa production and marketing is dominated by males.  Fermentation, 
clearing, and brushing are also tasks typically assigned to male household members.  
Other household members, primarily youth and women, contribute to harvest and post-
harvest activities including breaking the cocoa pods, bean preparation, transportation and 
drying.   
Concerns have been raised with regard to child labor in West African cocoa 
producing countries.  Child labor has been seen as preparatory work experience 
(Nkamleu and Kielland 2006).  Of the producing and marketing cocoa household 
members, 340 individuals aged 3-20 (30.9%) contribute to the household’s cocoa labor.  
Of the 340, 41.7% attended school in addition to working on their household’s cocoa 
farm.  The other 58.8% indicated that, in addition to contributing to cocoa labor, they 
were economically active in other areas and not attending school (Table 16).   
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Although Liberia has a high rate of unemployment, the farmer’s access and ability 
to compensate labor outside the family may be limited.  Sixty-three households (18%) 
had hired workers for seasonal work or on a per task basis.  Some farmers hired labor for 
multiple tasks.  The average wages, employees, and hours worked per task are repeated in 
Table 17.  A majority (55%) of the hired labor was used to brush (clearing out the 
undergrowth) at the cocoa farms.  A majority of these workers (870) were identified as 
being from the local community and 18 were identified as being Guinean.  
4.5. Land Tenure 
Land tenure remains a tenuous issue as farmers return to their ancestral villages to 
reinstate claims on property.  Proof of ownership may be difficult given disputed property 
demarcations and rudimentary records.  Issues also arise when the head of house or 
virtually the entire family was killed during the civil war.  Traditional inheritance of land 
falls to members of the extended family, regardless of whether the inheritors are members 
of the village.  Undefined land rights affect farmers’ willingness to invest in mid- to long-
term improvements or expansions of current land holdings.  Of the 332 households, only 
23 respondents indicated that they had an official title to land.  When asked how those 
without a title were able to farm the land, 148 responded that this was their ancestral 
village, and 2 farmers had an arrangement with the village elder.   
Over 80% of all tree crop holdings for the producing and marketing households 
were inherited.  Households that indicated that they had the official title to their land 
(n=23), sold an average of 218 kg or 30% more than those who did not have the title to 
their land (168 kg), during the 2006/07 season.  However, when comparing households 
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that were residing in their ancestral village (n=296 households) sold on average 172kg 
versus those that were not, the non-ancestral villagers (n=36 households) who sold on 
average 166kg.  
4.6. Market and Price Descriptors 
4.6.1. Price 
Crucial to determining the factors that affect farmgate prices are the observed 
prices at the farmgate.  A comparison between observed farmgate cocoa prices in Liberia 
with those found in other African countries provides some indication of the current 
market conditions compared to other West African cocoa markets (Table 18).  The 
margin between the farmgate price and the ICCO price (Figure 17) is considerable.  The 
effect of infrastructure on the wide margin between the farmgate and ICCO price may be 
driven by transactions costs.  This wide margin may be further compounded by several 
factors, including low quality and quantity, few exporters and an underdeveloped 
marketing chain. 
Limited cooperation from buyers downstream led to an inability to determine 
conclusively the domestic marketing margins throughout the Liberian cocoa marketing 
chain during the 2006/07 season.  However, the few buyers who agreed to be interviewed 
indicated that an estimate of 75% or greater of the cocoa purchased in Liberia was 
transported and sold in Guinea.  Buyers indicated that there was a difference of $0.25-
0.42 USD/kg (or more) between the Monrovia port price and prices received in Guinea, 
despite the risk factors involved when transporting the cocoa to Guinea.  Anecdotal 
information from buyers indicated that they were required to pay “entrance” fees at both 
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borders.  Buyers also indicated that an influx of capital in Monrovia, coupled with 
violence in Guinea and cocoa in the marketing chain shifted trade flows to Monrovia at 
the end of the 2006/07 season.  Almost all the cocoa grown is sold during the main 
season, which falls between September and January.  Buyers presumably will minimize 
search costs, accounting for seasonal and transportation difficulties, thus procuring cocoa 
after the rainy season ends.  The size and frequency of sales increased during the months 
of October, November and December (Figure 18).  Individual transactions were typically 
less than 100 kg and rarely over 200 kg. 
Cell phones may have a wide application in market development in the long-run, 
though currently few farmers have access to cell phones.  Due to this, the impact of cell 
phone use, in relation to price information, is more likely to have an effect through the 
Liberian buyers.  Buyers may have greater access to cell phone service in the larger 
village in which they reside and may have more resources to devote to the ownership of a 
cell phone.  Buyers may have business relationships with buyers located in Guinea, and 
use a phone as a means to ascertain prices in the Guinean markets, unlike the typical rural 
cocoa farmer.  Buyers or farmers trading cocoa in Guinea face a language barrier since 
transactions are often held in the Liberian’s rudimentary French or the Guinean buyer’s 
rudimentary Liberian English.  Knowledge of prices further downstream may have aided 
buyers in setting marketing margins and directing trade flows.  For farmers, market 
information may aid in negotiation of prices or improvement of quality.  Despite 
uncertainties, smuggling is often worth the risk.  Farmer’s reported in interviews that they 
would often receive the equivalent of $0.08-0.25 USD/kg more for their cocoa after 
accounting for transportation and transactions costs compared to the farmgate price.   
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4.6.2. Discounts 
Buyers trying to meet exporter quantity demands, will sometimes purchase wet 
cocoa beans (and reportedly sometimes even moldy) with quality discounts taken.  These 
discounts are paid to buyers through a weight deduction from the final sale weight.  For 
example, the buyer will estimate that there are wet beans in the lot and ask the farmer to 
give him an extra 2 kg per bag for “free” to compensate.  The deduction effectively 
lowers the price received by farmers.  Often a kilogram is also deducted from the total 
amount sold to account for the weight of the sack holding the cocoa.  Liberian buyers 
negotiate prices based on perceived quality, as industry standard procedures are not used 
to ascertain quality.  Farmers without knowledge of quality improvement practices are 
left to the discretion of the buyers (Pay-Bayee 2005).  Despite this, a majority (68%) of 
the discounts was taken for the weight of the bag alone and was not taken for quality.  
The average discount for quality was 2.7 kg per bag (Table 19).  
The buyer often measures quality by obtaining a sample of beans and cutting 
them in half or hand rolling them to ascertain bean moisture levels.  Level of 
fermentation is estimated by examining bean color (Dand 1999).  In Liberia, measuring 
quality and determining discounts is highly subjective and depends on the buyer’s 
knowledge of good quality and the honesty of the buyer’s assessment, since no 
instruments are used.  Farmers, for their part, may be improperly fermenting and drying 
the beans as a means of saving time, a lack of knowledge about fermenting or drying 
practices or simply a lack of incentive to do otherwise.  Fermentation of cocoa in Liberia 
occurs in hanging banana-leaf-covered baskets, in a pile wrapped in banana leaves, or a 
tarpaulin on the ground.  Farmers reported fermenting beans from two days to a week.  
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Drying times ranged from three days to a week.  Farmers typically used bamboo mats or 
tarps to dry cocoa (Table 20). 
4.6.3. Transportation 
Access to transportation is limited for many farmers.  Of the 332 respondents, 
only 13 had bicycles, 5 a moped or motorcycle, and 1 a pickup truck.  If farmers were 
able to transport cocoa to the Monrovia port, they would more than likely have to take 
some form of taxi service or rent space on a vehicle transporting goods.  The averages for 
a taxi ride, from the buying centers to Monrovia can be found in Table 21.  Farmers 
interviewed indicated that, those who could transport cocoa to a regional buying center or 
to the port were compensated with the equivalent of $0.083 – 0.25 USD per kilogram 
($5-15LD) more than at the farmgate.  
Transportation to and from many villages in remote areas can be especially tricky 
during the wet season.  Of the surveyed villages, only 2 were located on paved roads.  
The remaining 38 were accessible on dirt roads that are often easily washed out during 
the heavy rains.  Road quality is only part of the issue.  Transportation laws are also a 
factor, and vary between counties.  In the start of 2006, remote areas of Nimba and Lofa 
County had vehicle weight restrictions (Figure 20).  Depending on the remoteness of the 
village, villagers may have limited access to regional buying centers.  Villages that are 
farther from the regional centers have difficulty attracting buyers, investment, and 
possibly extension or aid activities.  However, remote villages closer to the Guinea 
border, may still have advantage due to the proximity of the market.  The distances in 
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kilometers from village to buying center and buying center to Monrovia and Guinea are 
found in Table 13.  
4.6.4. Credit 
At the time of the study (2006/07), there were few sources of credit or loans for 
cocoa farmers in Liberia.  A majority of the credit obtained, solely for use on cocoa 
farms, was from the local cocoa buyer (85%) (Figure 19).  Interviews with farmers 
suggest that offering credit becomes an opportunity for buyers to secure cocoa supply 
prior to harvest and to offer lower prices at the time of sale.  This takes the form of 
buyers often taking advantage of the farmer’s cash needs and offer credit to be repaid at 
harvest and not charging interest, but offering lower prices to the farmer at the time of 
sale.  Seventy-eight (23%) of the cocoa farmers took out loans during the 2006/07 season.  
The average loan size was $18.86 USD.  Eighty-five percent of these loans were taken 
out from produce buyers, 18% of the loans had interest collected on top of the principle, 
ranging from 1.3% to 25% interest.25 The average length of a loan was 3.3 months.  
Loans were used primarily for farm cleaning and maintenance. 
4.6.5. Farmer Organizations 
Farmer organizations may be a way to promote educational training, access to 
credit, and group bargaining.  Only five of the market transactions captured in the survey 
were brokered by a farmer group, only 7 respondents belonged to a farmer organization 
and each paid an average of $2.80 USD ($168 LD) for yearly membership dues.  These 
                                                 
 
25 Calculated as simple interest (principle*interest rate*loan length). 
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members used the farmer organizations to collectively market (1), obtain inputs (1), gain 
technical advice (3), obtain market information (1) or for access to Kuu labor (1). 
4.6.6. Market Information 
Rural Liberia has limited access to communication tools that might be effectively 
used to transmit price information.  Cell phone use is constrained by limited signal 
availability.  In addition, cell phones are still costly.  Only 14 (4%) of the farmers who 
marketed cocoa had access to a cell phone.  Much of the price information was gathered 
from local sources such as buyers and friends. Buyers often benefit from information 
asymmetries and the information they do convey may not be objective.  Friends and 
neighbors may also be poorly informed or simply received from buyers (Figure 21).  
Given the lack of market information, it is difficult to know whether well informed 
farmers were actually able to negotiate higher prices without further analysis.  Evidence 
from other countries, such as Cameroon, suggests that the dissemination of accurate 
market information can have a positive effect on farmgate prices received by farmers 
(Wilcox 2006). 
4.6.7. County Factors 
Differences between counties may have a large impact on the cocoa household 
and the market environment in which they participate.  Bong, Lofa and Nimba County 
were often considered major crop producing counties prior to the war, especially Bong, 
which had a high estimate of cocoa farmers in 2001 (Table 6) (Pay-Bayee 2005).  Of the 
three counties surveyed, anecdotal and historical evidence suggests that fighting in 
Nimba subsided earlier during the conflict and deemed safe after 1991.  In contrast, 
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farmers who had evacuated Bong and Lofa started returning home around 2003 (Pay-
Bayee 2005).  This may be an important factor in the development of the marketplace and 
the rehabilitation/reinvestment of cocoa farms.  Enumerators tried to ascertain a more 
accurate assessment of when farmers returned to their villages.  Of the 20 that responded, 
17 people from Lofa indicated that they had returned from exile or from IDP camps in 
2005 or 2006.  
Several control variables in the price transmission model that are expected to have 
a positive effect on farmgate prices were most favorable in Nimba County (Table 22).  
The market in Nimba is potentially the most developed since 58% of the cocoa sold in the 
2006/07 baseline originated in Nimba.  Farmers also had greater access to resources, such 
as transportation (TRANSPORT), cell phones (CELL), and farmer organizations 
(BFARM).  Cocoa farmers in Nimba also had larger families, presumably a larger labor 
pool, and more years of education.   
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CHAPTER 5. PRICE DETERMINATION RESULTS 
5.1. Overall Model Results 
None of the variance inflation factors were greater than 10, suggesting that the 
variances were not seriously inflated due to collinearity (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch 1980).  
One eigenvalue returned a value of 119, which warranted further inspection.  For that 
eigenvalue, LIFFE and the intercept had proportions of variation of 0.967 and 0.978, 
indicating that collinearity between these variables might have reduced the reliability of 
the t-test for LIFFE.  However, the coefficient for LIFFE was significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting the its variance was not inflated enough for multicollinearity to be a concern 
(Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch 1980).  The lack of evidence of serious multicollinearity 
suggests that inferences drawn for the coefficients of the price determination model are 
reliable.   
White’s test confirmed the presence of heteroskedasticity.  The presence of 
heteroskedasticity biases the standard errors and therefore affects the t and F statistics.  
Without adjustment the covariance estimators are inconsistent and inferences may be 
incorrect (White 1980).  The usage of the approximated jackknife procedure adjusted the 
standard errors, correcting for the unknown bias.  The explanatory power of the adjusted 
model as measured by the adjusted R2 equals 0.20 (Table 23).  The overall significance of 
the model (β1=…= β21 =0), as measured by the F-test was found to be significant (F21,510 
=6.98, p<0.001). 
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5.2. World Price and Discount 
The world price (LIFFE) and the dummy variable for quality discounts 
(QUALMAT) were significant at the 1% level.  The significant positive coefficient for the 
world price (LIFFE) suggests that farmers are receiving price signals from the world 
market, holding all other factors constant.  When testing the hypothesis that H0: β1=1, the 
F-value (F2,529 =252.75) was insignificant at the 10% level.  However, testing H0: β1=0, 
the F-value (F1,510 =7.34) was significant at the 1% level .  These results imply that the 
transmission of the world price is not perfect, nor is it zero, therefore the LIFFE price has 
an effect on the farmgate price.  The coefficient for the LIFFE price was $0.146 and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a $1 increase (decrease) in the LIFFE price 
translates into only a $0.146 increase (decrease) in the farmgate price.  The low 
transmission may be due to numerous factors, especially given the resource limitations in 
Liberia already explained.  The price elasticity of the farmgate price with respect to the 
LIFFE price is 0.704, which means that a 1% increase (decrease) in the LIFFE price is 
accompanied by only a 0.7% increase in the farmgate price, resulting in a less varied 
farmgate price.  The resulting price margins created by fluctuations in the LIFFE price 
translates into a larger percentage of the margin captured by the buyers when the LIFFE 
price increases and a larger percentage loss with decreases than the farmers experience at 
the farmgate. Buyers will be more likely to enter the market when the downstream prices 
are higher and higher prices are less likely to be transferred to the farmer. Farmers unable 
to receive benefits from increased prices may be unable to react by increasing production 
or quality. Exporters use the world price to set the market price (the price to the 
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intermediaries) and thus the farmgate price.  However, the extent of the margin that 
intermediaries capture could not be measured with the data obtained. 
Liberian cocoa receives a discount on the world market for poor quality 
perceptions.  In turn, exporters located at the port in Monrovia adjust their marketing 
margins.  This can add pressure to marketing margins, driving down prices through the 
marketing chain.  Traders up-country may be unwilling to purchase cocoa that is below 
the quality that they can sell.  Although some buyers purchase cocoa that is not 
completely dried or fermented in order to process it themselves.  These risks that the 
buyers face ultimately fall on the farmer, contributing to low farmgate prices.  
Anecdotally, farmers perceive that quality is unimportant, perhaps due to information 
given to them by buyers who use cocoa as arbitrage (access to foreign exchange or 
importable goods) or who finish processing the cocoa themselves.  However, farmers did 
receive discounts for wet or moldy beans (QUALMAT).  Discounts taken for poorly dried 
cocoa decreased the effective farmgate price by $0.02 per kilogram, significant at the 1% 
level.  For example, if the farmer is receiving an average price of $0.34 for 100kg, a 
$0.02 reduction per kilogram results in a $2 loss (5%).  Approximately 25% of the 
sample was affected by quality discounts (Table 22). 
5.3. Transportation 
Transportation variables TGDIST and TMDIST were both significant at the 1% 
level.  Although measured as distance, they are related to cost and thus detract from the 
effective farmgate price.  Distance to Monrovia (TMDIST) had a positive coefficient 
which suggests other factors (e.g. trade flows) may be at play.  The significance of these 
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variables implies that distance from the farmgate to the buyer’s terminal market (the port 
in Monrovia or the Guinea Border in 2006/07) affects the buyer’s willingness to pay a 
higher price.  Many of the farm-to-market roads are difficult to navigate with large or 
heavy vehicles, meaning that more remote villages would have higher transportation 
costs for buyers, through lower quality roads or taking more trips in a smaller vehicle to 
procure cocoa.  The elasticity of TGDIST with respect to the effective farmgate price is -
0.350, suggesting that buyers are choosing villages that are close to the Guinea border to 
procure cocoa.   
An alternative explanation to the coefficients for these variables could be that 
buyers’ understand transportation cost margins prior to being in the market and that 
decisions are based on trade flows or price fluctuations in alternative markets.  
Anecdotally, buyers indicated that prices were higher in Guinea during the 2006/07 
season.  Buyers more than likely had this information and focused their collection efforts 
closer to Guinea, increasing competition among buyers and the demand for cocoa closer 
to Guinea.  Therefore, as distance decreases to Guinea (TGDIST) the effective farmgate 
price increased by $0.002.  This result implies that prices of cocoa purchased from farms 
closer to the Guinean market were higher than prices paid farther from Guinea.  
Conversely, a one kilometer increase in distance from Monrovia (TMDIST) increases the 
effective farmgate price by $0.001.  The variable QINV was insignificant, implying that 
the size of the individual transactions did not affect the effective farmgate price.  Buyers 
may not have had previous knowledge in regards to quantities harvested in the villages or 
that they had to travel farther from the market to fill their quotas and procure cocoa. 
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Transportation costs are a considerable factor, given the distance traveled from 
village to market (Table 13).  In the 2006/07 season, 14% of farmers sold their cocoa at 
the buying centers (BTRANS).  This could be due to the fact that only 6.4% of farmers 
had access to transportation (TRANSPORT).  As such, it was incumbent upon the buyers 
to provide transport.  If farmers have no increased price incentives to leave the farmgate 
or ulterior motives to travel to the buying center, buyers will account for their travel as 
variable costs and farmers will receive lower effective farmgate prices. 
5.4. Market Information and Resources 
The variables in the market information and resources category found to be 
significant were BFARM, at the 10% level, OMRKTIN at the 10% level, and BCRED at 
the 5% level.  The signs were as expected, except for OMRKTIN, which had a negative 
coefficient (Table 23).  During the 2006/07 season, Liberian farmer organizations were 
rarely involved in cocoa transactions.  Despite their limited membership, participation in 
farmer organizations appears to have a positive effect on effective farmgate prices 
received by members.  Farmers participating in farmer organization (BFARM) received 
on average $0.024 more than those not involved.  Some reasons for this may be access to 
technical advice, market information, access to labor, or countervailing market power.  
On average, 16.4 % of the transactions were from farmers who were involved in farmer 
organizations, although the average was higher in Nimba (27.9%) than in Bong (0.9%) 
and Lofa (8.8%).   
Market price information received from radio, newspaper, and government 
extension (MKTIN) was no different than not receiving any price information.  Only 
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3.6% of the sample received market information from these sources.  A higher percentage 
(84.6%) of the sample received market information from possibly non-reliable or non-
objective sources.  Farmers who received market information from friends, neighbors or 
produce buyers (OMKTIN) received lower effective farmgate price by $0.017.  This may 
represent a bias in the information, with buyers convincing farmers of lower prevailing 
prices or neighbors protecting their own marketing abilities or perpetuating the buyer’s 
misinformation.  Access to cell phones (CELL) for the farmer was unrelated to farmgate 
cocoa prices.    
With little to no formal banking structure in Liberia, farmers rely on buyers or 
local money lenders for loans specifically related to cocoa farms.  A majority of these 
loans are supplied by produce buyers (Figure 19).  Farmers receiving loans from cocoa 
buyers (BCRED) received $0.024 less than those who received no loan at all (NOCRED), 
while prices received by farmers who received loans from other sources (NONBCRED) 
were no different from those received by farmers who did not obtain a loan.  Buyers 
supply credit to procure cocoa before the harvest season begins.  Farmers may receive 
lower effective farmgate prices as a means of paying interest.   
5.5. Farmer Characteristics 
Social and human capital may be important in making household decisions on 
economic activities.  In the regression model, none of the farmer specific characteristics 
was significant.  Attempts to capture the effects of more detailed aspects of the household 
composition through family size (FAMSIZE), education of the head of household 
(EDUC), head of household’s years as a cocoa farmer (CEXP), and the household’s 
 68
dependency on cocoa farms over all other tree crops (CHOLD) were not significant 
factors in explaining farmgate prices.  This suggests that the education of the farmer may 
not equate to higher quality cocoa or price negotiating ability, and experience navigating 
the cocoa market may not affect the farmer’s ability to negotiate better prices.   
5.6. Season and Location 
Seasonality (WET) and county location (BIGCTR, NIMBA and LOFA) were 
significant at the 1% level.  The rainy season was negatively correlated with effective 
farmgate prices.  During the rainy season, farmgate price was negatively impacted by 
$0.034.  Heavy rains degrade farm-to-market roads, making some villages inaccessible 
by vehicles.  Villages that are accessible may require more time navigating roads, digging 
out vehicles, or waiting for debris to be cleared from the roads to procure cocoa.  The 
rainy season occurs concurrently at the start of the cocoa harvesting season when the 
cocoa is being harvested, fermented and dried.  The rainy season affects the ability to 
harvest, ferment and dry cocoa, especially given that few farmers have the resources to 
ferment and dry cocoa off of the ground.  Inability to properly prepare cocoa for the 
marketplace can disrupt the supply to the marketing chain.   
Farmers located near regional buying centers (BIGCTR) received $0.041 less than 
farmers located near local buying centers.  All else equal, farmers located closer to the 
regional buying centers have access to larger buyers with more resources or increased 
avenues for price competition.  Another plausible alternative is that farmers located near 
regional buying centers may produce perishable food crops for urban populations, 
increasing the opportunity costs of growing cocoa.  Another concern, given the legality of 
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cross-border smuggling, buyers may be inclined to avoid larger population centers that 
may have a higher presence of government enforcement officers.   
Cross county differences impact effective farmgate prices.  The dummy variables 
for Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties were calculated to compare effective farmgate prices 
in the counties with the overall average.  Farmers located in Nimba County (NIMBA) 
received $0.028 more than the average effective farmgate price.  Farmers in Lofa County 
(LOFA) received $0.033 less than the average.  There may be intrinsic qualities to these 
counties that affect their effective farmgate prices.  Farmers in Nimba County may have 
better access to markets due to its proximity to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire . 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Through the production and export of cocoa, Liberia has the opportunity to work 
towards at least three of the Millennium Development Goals set forth by the United 
Nations (UN 2008).  Cocoa has the potential to increase rural income and decrease food 
insecurity which may aid in alleviating extreme poverty and hunger (Goal 1).  Through 
the improvement of cocoa varieties and emphasis on agroforestry management, cocoa can 
enhance environmental sustainability (Goal 7).  With improvements in the marketing 
chain, Liberia may be able through the use of farmer groups and improvements in quality 
and infrastructure to develop global partnerships in the cocoa industry (Goal 8).  Liberian 
cocoa represents an important source of income for rural populations.  Focusing on this 
export crop may result in increases in welfare and incomes for thousands of cocoa 
producing households.  Improving the transmission of the world price to the farmgate by 
integrating market efficiency and cocoa quality enhancement practices into the marketing 
chain will help farmers receive improved price signals from the world market and 
improve decision making.   
The objectives of this research were to describe the characteristics of Liberian 
cocoa producing households and determine the factors that affect Liberian farmgate 
cocoa prices.  It is important to note that this analysis is only a snapshot of the cocoa 
market during the 2006/07 season and that there were limitations with respect to data 
collection.  During the 2007/08 season, preliminary indications suggest an increased 
presence of farmer groups in cocoa market transactions.  More exporters entered the 
Liberian market and thus created greater competition, which shifted trade flows to 
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Monrovia from Guinea.  Coupled with higher world prices for raw cocoa, farmers 
experienced over twice the farmgate prices in the 2007/08 season than in the 2006/07 
season (Gockowski and Wilcox 2008).  This research may provide a starting point for 
further surveys and as a reference for comparison as the market dynamics change and 
further studies are undertaken.   
6.1. The Market 
The Liberian cocoa market is chaotic and continually changing.  The marketing 
chain is buyer-driven with possible market power issues.  Decreasing barriers to entry 
and increasing production will allow the market to determine price and quantity more 
efficiently.  Throughout the marketing chain various barriers limit the entry of new 
market participants.  At the farmgate, low cocoa prices discourage production.  Low 
production leads to entry barriers further down the marketing chain.  With current 
production in Liberia, it is possible for a single firm to dominate the export market.  
Competing for the limited throughput at the current prices and quantity available may not 
persuade firms to enter at any stage in the marketing chain.  Increases in production can 
be encouraged through better farm management training, and access to hybrid varieties or 
chemical inputs.  Increasing public access to price information along the marketing chain 
could also reduce market power issues at the farmgate.  Through reductions in marketing 
margins and encouraging legislation in favor of a transparent business climate will 
encourage competition in the market place, and thus encourage higher prices (Gockowski 
and Wilcox 2008). 
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Opening the market to new participants may limit buyers from exerting market 
power through lower prices or restricting credit access.  Remoteness and access to rural 
populations will continue to be an issue in market development.  Infrastructural 
limitations, such as distance to markets, road quality, and access to transportation 
constrain the cocoa market in Liberia inhibit entry into the market and result in low 
farmgate prices.  Villages farther from buying centers or villages located in remote areas 
have limited or no access to cocoa markets.  Remoteness of villages may dissuade buyers 
especially during the rainy season.  Improving transportation to the villages will improve 
other aspects of the Liberian livelihood, as well as decreasing transportation costs 
associated with the procurement of cocoa.   
One of the main objectives of many of the government parastatals was to ensure 
quality throughout the marketing chain.  Liberalization of the cocoa market in Liberia 
was not legislated or planned but rather the fallout from a devastating civil war.  
Therefore, the lack of market structure in Liberia further hinders quality control 
throughout the marketing chain.  Liberian cocoa has never had a reputation for high 
quality.  This is mainly due to the LPMC creating a market for only fair average quality 
cocoa that does not meet international standards for the cocoa-based sector of the 
confectionary industry.  Improvements in quality standards and practices, coupled with 
enforcement, will benefit Liberian cocoa on the world market.  At the time of the survey, 
there were no external market mechanisms in place, public or private, to ensure quality 
standards were practiced.  Improving quality may increase competition in the market 
place and improve farmgate cocoa prices, while possibly opening access to more global 
and niche markets.   
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Balancing Liberia’s dependency on forest resources for economic welfare and 
conservation of biodiversity is important for the long-term stability of rural populations, 
as they rely heavily on the forest for food and income.  Food security and food prices 
remain issues in Liberia, improving access to both food crops and incomes will continue 
to benefit the rural cocoa farmers and the population as a whole.  Improving varieties of 
cocoa and intercropping stands with food crops may alleviate the need to expand further 
into forest lands, while meeting the demand for food and tree crops.  Concurrently an 
improvement of cocoa yields through improved germplasm would increase the farmer’s 
ability to participate in the marketplace through economies of size. 
Further research could look at market integration and efficiency.  When markets 
are missing, the transfer of benefits to the farmgate and throughout the marketing chain is 
hindered.  Ascertaining a more accurate estimate of farm-level yields, coupled with 
information from the census underway, would give a more complete assessment of 
Liberia’s productive capabilities.  Looking more in depth into arbitrage opportunities that 
affect farmer and buyer perceptions, decisions to participate in illegal border trade and 
the effectiveness of regional trade oversight by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) or the government would be beneficial.  Continuing research 
on marketing margins downstream from the farmgate may be beneficial for further 
analysis of the Liberian cocoa market.  As the situation changes in Liberia, factors 
affecting marketing margins will change.  Exogenous factors in the global marketplace 
will continue to affect outcomes upstream for farmers through the prices farmers receive.  
Looking at the effects of policies in the short, medium, and long terms would be 
beneficial in further policy formation. 
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6.2. The Cocoa Household 
There are many problems that arise with re-emerging agricultural export crops, 
such as cocoa, in developing nations.  In Liberia, these issues include balancing the trade-
offs between household food security and the production of a marketable food surplus or 
export crops, disseminating price information, and introducing and maintaining quality 
standards starting at the farmgate.  All of which are further compounded by the various 
health and social issues associated with the devastation of prolonged civil conflict 
affecting rural populations. 
Liberian cocoa receives a heavy discount on the world market.  Since global 
processors reject moldy or off flavored cocoa, concerns over quality possibly relegate 
Liberian cocoa to usage in secondary (cosmetic) markets.  Improving quality processes 
through improved access to agricultural inputs and education is paramount.  Physical 
unavailability of agricultural inputs in most areas, in addition to prohibitive prices, limits 
the use of insecticides and pesticides.  While not using agricultural chemicals may allow 
Liberian cocoa farmers to enter organic markets more easily, it hinders their ability to 
manage cocoa stands.  To increase yields, substantial investments into agricultural inputs 
will need to be made.   
Market power is limited for the farmer as they have little opportunity to negotiate 
prices.  Buyers often benefit from asymmetric price information and can leverage loans 
as a means to set prices.  Better market information throughout the marketing chain may 
lead to more transparency and thus allow farmers to negotiate.  Credit opportunities are 
limited to farmers wanting to increase the quality and quantity of cocoa.  Improving 
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access to credit or regulating the current credit market to give farmers more credit options 
besides produce buyers who effectively decrease farmgate prices is desirable. 
Farmers suffer from a lack of extension activities.  To improve quality and yields 
produced at the farm-level, farmers will need training in new techniques of cocoa farming 
and access to improved varieties of cocoa.  STCP-Liberia is working to fill the gap in 
cocoa related training through creation of Farmer Field Schools (FFS) in Bong and 
Nimba counties with a planned future expansion into Lofa County.  In 2007, 24 new FFS 
were established, in addition to the 15 FFS created in Nimba County in 2006.  These 
schools are estimated to reach up to 700 direct beneficiaries and 2,100 farmer-to-farmer 
(indirect beneficiaries) throughout Bong and Nimba counties (STCP 2007).   
Overarching issues like land tenure, education and labor affect overall household 
stability and growth.  Land tenure will affect the farmer’s decisions on land usage.  If 
farmers are unable to expand or define their current land holdings, alternative decisions 
may be made to improve food security over gaining income from cocoa.  Children who 
are not currently receiving education and are economically active (working agriculturally 
or otherwise) may be in a precarious position.  These children may not be learning basic 
reading, writing and math skills required to thrive in an increasingly global and 
competitive world.  Additionally, without basic education, rural populations do not have 
access to the skills they need to operate in a global business environment.  Improving 
incomes through cocoa production may allow farmers to be less dependent on household-
provided labor and more able to fund schooling opportunities for dependants. 
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6.3. Farmer Organizations 
Farmer organizations have proven useful in countervailing market power of 
private firms (Wilcox 2006).  Farmer groups can provide resources such as collective 
marketing, market information, education activities, and labor or credit opportunities.  
Farmer organizations serve as points of contact and intermediaries between farmers in the 
field and other groups (e.g., the government, NGOs, industry).  Furthermore, farmers can 
benefit from the collective experience and knowledge of other farmers in their area.   
Whether through encouragement of farmer organizations, non-governmental 
programs or dismantling, restructuring, or resolving issues with LMPC, farmers would 
benefit from increased access to training, resources and marketing groups.  Policy 
options, such as the continuation and expansion of farmer field schools, formation of 
farmer groups, and the development of supporting private and public institutions, will 
play a critical role in the formation of formal domestic markets in Liberia which, in turn, 
may have a positive impact on Liberian farmgate cocoa prices. 
6.4. Buyers and Intermediaries 
As the market evolves with the ebb and flow of buyers and intermediaries in the 
marketing chain and consolidation in the processing sector, concerns over market power 
remain.  The LPMC essentially held monopsonistic power over farmers.  It is important 
that as the private market defines its presence, that the monopsonistic power is not merely 
transferred from public to private entities.  The lack of objective and accurate market 
information transferred from buyers to producers will have implications with regards to 
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market power.  Additionally, the lack of objectivity and measurement tools when 
assessing quality will continue to send biased price signals from buyers to producers. 
6.5. Exporters 
During the 2006/07 season, only one shipment of cocoa occurred through 
Monrovia.  Anecdotally, buyers were receiving higher prices in Guinea until civil unrest 
in Conakry halted trade in February.  With cocoa remaining upcountry in the marketing 
chain, trade to Monrovia became attractive with the entry of a new exporter with access 
to public capital.  At the start of the 2007/08 season, the two Monrovia exporters were 
still competing with Guinean buyers.  Entry in October by an additional firm in Monrovia 
led to increased participation in the export market and upward price competition appears 
to have played a role in farmgate prices more than doubling (Gockowski and Wilcox 
2008).   
At the time of this study, the LMPC was stifling growth in the market internally 
by maintaining barriers to entry in the export market.  The over taxing of exporters 
without providing them adequate services, along with its international debt which 
effectively prohibits their participation in international markets, furthers the call for the 
LPMC’s complete dismantling.  However, dismantling the LMPC may be politically 
problematic as employment opportunities are still scarce in Liberia.  However, with debts 
also owed to farmers and their current limited capacity to function, putting a new face on 
the same organization will not likely inspire confidence that change has occurred.   
Using examples from cocoa producing countries, the government might consider 
abolishing the parastal in favor of government cooperation with entities (e.g. 
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intermediaries, farmer organizations) in different aspects of the market.  The government 
might also consider partnering with industry and farmers to create short-term financial 
incentives for increased production of good quality cocoa. 
6.6. The Government 
The Government of Liberia can play an important role in the future of the 
Liberian cocoa market.  Through policy formation and enforcement, the Government can 
improve the legal, business, and banking aspects of the cocoa marketing chain.  Polices 
can direct the use of government funds to improve infrastructure, specifically in the 
building and maintenance of roads.  Market participants need a legal framework for 
arbitration, enforcement of contracts, and protection from corrupt practices.  The 
government could also encourage sources of financial capital through improvements in 
the banking system.  Microcredit loans would provide market participants with more 
choices to access credit or keep savings.  Government intervention in these aspects of the 
marketing chain may increase transparency and encourage business development. 
The government is also in the position of providing and securing peace through 
rule of law.  If security, especially in rural areas, remains tenuous, attracting foreign 
investment, increasing producer incentive and stabilizing internal country supply chains 
will be difficult.  Farmers and buyers with few marketing opportunities or price 
incentives in Monrovia will continue to trade cocoa on the path of least resistance 
(smuggling) and the highest opportunity (higher prices or means to gain other goods).  
With limited rural infrastructure, regional instability directing market flows and the lack 
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of local outlets may dissuade producers from producing and marketing high-value export 
crops.   
The marketing chain may benefit from oversight on quality control and extension 
activities.  Further research into the costs and benefits of creating a government entity to 
provide public services to the cocoa market would be useful in policy formation.  Many 
of the institutional and infrastructural constraints in Liberia may be too great for private 
enterprise or NGOs to manage.  
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Table 1: Basic Economic and Social Indicators for Liberia, 2000-2007 
Indicator Year Value 
Population, (millions) 2006 3.4 
Population growth (annual %) 2006 2.9 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 2007 149.73 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 2005 44.7 
Rural population growth rate (% p.a.) 2005 0.3 
Rural as % total population (%) 2005 41.9 
School enrollment, primary (% net) 2005 57.4 
Adult literacy (% Over 15yrs) 2007 57.5 
Unemployment rate (%) 2003 85 
GDP (current US$) (billions) 2006 0.6 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 2006 140 
GDP growth rate (% p.p.p in real terms) 2006 7.8 
GDP per capita (current US$) (PPP) 2007 500 
Agriculture GDP share (%) 2007 76.9 
Tree crops as % export value (%) 2007 60 
Total aid (current US$) (millions) 2006 268.7 
Total external debt (current US$) (billions) 2005 2.7 
Source: World Bank (2007c); CIA (2007); FAOSTAT (2008).  
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Table 2: Estimates of Liberian Export Earnings by Product from 2000 - 2005 
Product 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rubber 47.5% 42.2% 35.6% 40.3% 90.0% 88.0% 
Other 0.9% 3.4% 3.8% 8.7% 6.7% 7.0% 
Cocoa  0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.8% 3.4% 5.1% 
Timber 50.7% 54.1% 60.3% 50.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Coffee 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total exports ($US 
millions) 
120.3 127.9 166.5 108.9 103.8 112.2 
Source: IMF (2006) 
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Table 3: Percentage of World Cocoa Production for Top Producers and Liberia, 
1985,1990,1995,2000-2004 
Country ab 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Côte d'Ivoire  27.56 31.89 37.45 41.37 41.18 38.74 37.94 34.1 
Ghana  9.65 11.59 13.5 12.94 12.06 10.43 13.95 18.88 
Indonesia  1.68 5.62 9.31 12.48 13.26 17.49 16.08 15.4 
Nigeria  7.94 9.64 6.79 10.02 10.53 10.41 10.13 9.37 
Brazil  21.39 10.12 9.92 5.83 5.75 5.35 4.77 5.02 
Cameroon  5.87 4.54 4.48 3.63 3.78 3.83 4.35 4.27 
Ecuador  6.49 3.82 2.86 2.96 2.35 2.69 2.46 3.17 
Colombia  2.11 2.22 1.89 1.32 1.35 1.48 1.47 1.3 
Mexico  2.53 1.74 1.65 0.83 1.45 1.41 1.36 1.24 
Dominican Republic  1.71 1.7 2.16 1.1 1.39 1.52 1.31 1.21 
Papua New Guinea  1.75 1.51 0.97 1.39 1.2 1.3 1.19 1.09 
Malaysia  4.92 9.76 4.4 2.08 1.79 1.46 1.02 0.86 
Guinea  0.2 0.07 0.15 0.1 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.25 
Sierra Leone  --- 0.95 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.24 
Madagascar  0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 
Liberia  0.25 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 
Total 94.18 94.45 95.69 96.27 96.31 96.38 96.51 96.33
Source: FAOSTAT (2007).  
a Percent of total annual world production sorted by share in 2004. 
b Countries highlighted in yellow are located on the African continent.
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Table 4: Agronomic Conditions for Growing Cocoa 
Category Description 
Distribution Countries within 10 degrees North and 10 degrees South of the Equator; often lower storey of evergreen rainforest 
Temperature 21-30C 
Rainfall 
Rainfall is of primary concern with regard to yield. Rainfall should be fairly 
evenly distributed with annual average of between 1,500mm and 2,000mm. 
Persistent lack of rainfall (less than 100mm) detrimental. 
Humidity Relative humidity is generally high, often as much as 100% during the day, falling to 70-80% during the night. 
Light And 
Shade 
Shading is indispensable in a cocoa tree's early years, often cropped with 
plantains or wide leaf plants. The cocoa tree will make optimum use of any 
light available and has been traditionally grown under shade.  
Soil Conditions 
Physical 
properties  
Coarse particles leave free space for roots and a reasonable quantity of 
nutrients to a depth of 1.5m. Soil must have both water retention properties 
and good drainage.  Cocoa will withstand waterlogging for short periods, but 
is sensitive to a lack of water.  
Soil Conditions 
Chemical 
properties 
Cocoa can grow in soils with a pH in the range of 5.0-7.5. Cocoa is tolerant of 
acid soils (8.0) provided the nutrient content is high enough. High content of 
organic matter (3.5%) is needed in the top 15 centimeters of soil. The optimum 
total nitrogen/total phosphorus ratio should be around 1.5. 
Cocoa tree 
varieties 
Criollos 
Dominated the market until the middle of the eighteenth century but today 
only a few, if any, pure Criollo trees remain. 
Cocoa tree 
varieties 
Forastero 
Largest group containing cultivated, semi-wild and wild populations of which 
the Amelonado populations are the most extensively planted. Large areas of 
Brazil and West Africa are planted with Amelonado.  
Cocoa tree 
varieties 
Trinitario  
Across between Criollo and Forastero. Trinitario planting started in Trinidad 
and spread to Venezuela and then was planted in Ecuador, Cameroon, Samoa, 
Sri Lanka, Java and Papua New Guinea. 
Breeding 
Seeds 
Will germinate and produce good plants when taken from pods not more than 
15 days underripe. 
Breeding 
Cuttings 
Taken with between two and five leaves and one or two buds. The leaves are 
cut in half and the cutting placed in a pot under polythene until roots begin to 
grow. 
Breeding 
Budding 
A bud is cut from a tree and placed under a flap of bark on another tree. The 
budding patch is then bound with raffia, waxed tape of clear plastic to prevent 
moisture loss. When the bud is established the old tree above it is cut off. 
Breeding 
Marcotting 
A strip of bark is removed from a branch and the area covered in sawdust and 
a polythene sheet. The area will produce roots and the branch can then be 
chopped off and planted. 
Source: Dand (1999) and ICCO (2007),  
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Table 5: Per Capita Chocolate Consumption (Kilogram/Person)  
Country 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Switzerland 3.732 3.353 4.53 4.258 3.658 3.567 4.496 4.963 5.108 
Belgium/Luxembourg 5.671 5.169 5.165 4.966 5.475 5.228 5.57 5.639 4.986 
France 3.236 3.036 3.173 3.627 3.459 3.615 3.654 3.818 4.073 
Norway 2.929 2.826 2.631 2.695 3.082 2.917 3.1 3.686 3.754 
Austria 2.976 2.777 4.066 4.225 3.809 3.481 3.426 4.067 3.654 
United Kingdom 3.116 3.257 3.657 3.553 3.38 3.483 3.613 3.672 3.648 
Germany 3.023 3.526 3.467 3.334 3.596 3.426 3.395 3.718 3.36 
US 2.386 2.42 2.406 2.677 2.466 2.299 2.355 2.624 2.63 
Australia 2.17 2.299 2.385 2.179 2.113 2.27 2.213 2.3 2.568 
Israel 1.764 1.913 1.656 1.754 1.415 1.694 1.866 1.95 2.558 
Greece 0.869 1.529 2.119 1.699 1.564 1.859 1.932 1.996 2.211 
Netherlands 2.05 2.164 1.834 2.263 2.43 1.92 1.972 2.027 2.143 
Sweden 2.103 2.193 1.896 1.787 1.955 2.051 1.962 2.221 2.134 
Spain 1.533 1.757 1.697 2.017 1.756 1.689 1.854 2.115 2.098 
Czech 1.965 1.797 1.769 1.401 2.268 2.334 2.31 1.935 2.05 
Europe 1.686 1.693 1.722 1.814 1.869 1.875 1.9 2.007 2.027 
Canada 2.116 2.589 2.083 2.359 2.23 2.02 1.952 2.242 1.959 
Italy 1.487 1.589 1.685 1.551 1.754 1.737 1.764 1.731 1.891 
Poland 1.447 1.275 1.382 1.507 1.464 1.375 1.583 1.457 1.656 
Russian Federation 1.117 0.791 0.648 0.961 1.184 1.24 1.154 1.233 1.277 
Source: ICCO (2007c)
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Table 6: Number of Cocoa Producing Households by Liberian County and 
Percentage of Cocoa Holdings, 1976-1978,1981, and 2001 
 1976 1977 1978 1981 2001 
Bomi     320 
Bong 5,300 6,500 7,300 5,575 5,930 
Cape Mount 600 700 800 300 220 
Grand Bassa 3,100 3,100 3,300 1,765 790 
Grand Gedeh 3,900 4,500 4,800 2,400 1,700 
Grand Kru     240 
Lofa 8,600 9,300 10,400 8,800 - 
Margibi     250 
Maryland 2,200 2,400 2,600 4,250 550 
Montserrado 1,500 1,700 1,800 1,360 40 
Nimba 6,800 7,200 8,100 5,000 9,140 
Rivercess     80 
Sinoe 700 800 900 950 260 
Total 32,700 36,200 40,000 52,000 19,520 
Cocoa holdings as a 
% all Agricultural 
Households 
21% 23% 25% 27% 13% 
Source: MOA(1988), FAO/MOA (2001).
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Table 7: Exporter profit margins, marketing cost per ton and farmgate cocoa prices, Liberia 2006/2007 
Position  Price/Fee Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Avg. 
  -----------------------------USD $ per ton------------------------- 
ICCO price     1,567    1,530     1,581    1,703    1,702    1,617 
Liberian origin discount       189       189        189       189       189       189 World Market 
cif    1,379    1,341     1,392    1,514    1,513    1,428 
Ocean freight and insurance        111       111        111       111       111       111 
fob 1268 1230 1281 1403 1402    1,317 
freight shrinkage (1%)         14         13          14         15         15         14 
export conditioning costs         54         54          54         54         54         54 
government taxes (2.5% CIF value)         32         31          32         35         35         33 
BIVAC quality certificate (1.4%)         18         17          18         20         20         18 
Port 
LPMC royalty, fees, export declaration          62         62          62         62         62         62 
collection and transportation costs       155       155        155       155       155       155 Intermediaries 
profit margin and risk premium       611       570        588       677       632       616 
Farmgate farm gate  cocoa price       323       327        359       385       430       365 
 % of the F.O.B for the Farmer 26% 27% 28% 27% 31% 28%
 % of the F.O.B for the Buyer 48% 46% 46% 48% 45% 47%
  % of the F.O.B for the Government 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 13%
Source: Gockowski and Wilcox (2007)
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Table 8: Cocoa Buying Centers in Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties 
Bong Lofa Nimba 
Belefanai 
Gbarnga26 
Gbatala 
Kokoya 
Palala 
Zoweinta 
Bolahun 
Kolahun 
Salayea 
Voinjama 
Zorzor 
[Bahn]27 
Butuo 
[Ganta] 
Gbeilay (Beo) 
Karnplay 
Loguatuo 
Mehnla 
Saclepea 
Tappita 
Zikepa 
                                                 
 
26 Buying centers in bold and italics were chosen for the baseline survey. 
27 Villages in brackets were not included in the buying centers per se, but indicated to be 
aggregation points in calculating TGDIST for cocoa before being smuggled into Guinea.  
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Table 9: Number of Surveys Completed by Village in the Baseline Survey 
Number 
of 
Surveys 
Date Village Clan District County Buying Center 
25 11/4/06 & 3/6/07 Weinsue Jorpolu Jorquelleh Bong Gbarnga 
8 10/28/2006 Cooper-Ta Jorquelleh Jorquelleh Bong Gbarnga 
23 10/28/06 & 2/26/07 Melekie Jorquelleh Jorquelleh Bong Gbarnga 
16 10/31/06 Galai Suakoko Suakoko Bong Gbarnga 
16 3/7/07 & 3/8/07 Gwenima Suakoko Suakoko Bong Gbarnga 
16 10/3/2007 Jimmy Korkollie Suakoko Suakoko Bong Gbarnga 
21 10/24/06 & 2/25/07 Nai Suakoko Suakoko Bong Gbarnga 
16 9/3/2007 Benneh Yeanawon Suakoko Bong Gbarnga 
16 11/3/06 Kpoe Zota Zota Bong Gbarnga 
22 11/2/2006 Boepa Bonwein Kokoyah Bong Zoweinta 
24 11/1/06 & 2/3/07 Gbalorkpalar Soe Panta-Kpai Bong Zoweinta 
24 11/1/06 & 3/1/07 Malonkai Soe Panta-Kpai Bong Zoweinta 
24 11/2/06 & 3/4/07 Mileenta Wolota Kpai Bong Zoweinta 
23 10/16/06 & 1/31/07 Betibah Bondi Voinjama Lofa Voinjama 
16 10/16/06 Kennedy Farm Bondi Voinjama Lofa Voinjama 
16 10/17/06 Kpakumai Bondi Voinjama Lofa Voinjama 
24 10/15/06 & 2/1/07 Bolongoidu Quadu-Bondi Voinjama Lofa Voinjama 
16 10/18/06 Nassadu Quadu-Bondi Voinjama Lofa Voinjama 
24 10/17/06 & 01/02/07 Bazzagizzia Upper Walker Voinjama Lofa Voinjama 
16 2/21/07 Mehmeh Gbalein Salayea Lofa Zorzor 
23 10/25/06 & 2/18/07 Yeila Gizemai Zorzor Lofa Zorzor 
16 2/22/07 Kokolu-Zazay Palama Salayea Lofa Zorzor 
23 10/25/06 & 2/20/07 Gbanway Vavala Salayea Lofa Zorzor 
25 10/2/06 & 2/19/07 Sucromu Vavala Salayea Lofa Zorzor 
16 2/23/07 Nikebozu Zeyema Zorzor Lofa Zorzor 
20 10/24/06 & 2/17/07 Kpassagisia Zeyema Zorzor Lofa Zorzor 
25 10/23/06 & 2/16/07 Wakesu Zeyema Zorzor Lofa Zorzor 
24 10/23/06 & 2/15/07 Zelemai Zeyema Zorzor Lofa Zorzor 
21 10/3/06 & 1/22/07 Mlintontuo Boe-Quellah Tappita Nimba Bahn 
20 10/3/06 & 1/20/07 Fiaplay Gbor Zoe Geh Nimba Bahn 
16 9/06/06 & 9/29/06 Bayleglay Zoe Zoe Geh Nimba Bahn 
16 10/1/2006 Miaplay Yeazlay Zoe Zoe Geh Nimba Bahn 
18 10/7/06 & 1/26/07 Zahn-Boie Zahn Saclepea-Mah Nimba Saclepea 
18 9/27/06 & 1/15/07 Duoplay Sango-zoa Gbelaygeh Nimba Karnplay 
18 9/6/06 & 1/18/07 Slangonplay Sollay Gbelaygeh Nimba Karnplay 
20 9/6/06 & 1/17/07 Gbeh-Bonnah Sroh Gbelaygeh Nimba Karnplay 
25 9/6/06 & 1/15/07 Zualay Zor Gbelaygeh Nimba Sanequille 
23 10/04/06 & 1/24/07 Ganwee Mehnsonoh Yarwin-Mehnsonoh Nimba Saclepea 
21 10/6/06 & 1/7/07 Loyee Wee Saclepea-Mah Nimba Saclepea 
20 10/5/06 & 1/23/07 Beinglan Mehnsonoh Yarwin-Mehnsonoh Nimba Zoweinta 
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Table 10: Farmgate Price Determination Regression Variables, Expected Signs, and Description with Mean, Standard 
Deviation, Minimum, and Maximum 
Category Variable Coefficient 
Expect
ed 
Sign 
Units Description Mean  Std Min Max 
LIFFE  β1 + $/Kilogram London futures price by month of sale 1.66 0.08 1.58 1.77 
World Prices 
and Discount 
QUALMAT β2 - 
  
=1if the transaction had a discount 
associated with wet or moldy beans, 
else =0 
0.25 0.44 0 1 
TGDIST β3 - Kilometer Total distance from the village to Guinea border 67.52 21.90 25.9 122.65 
TMDIST β4 - Kilometer Total distance from the village to Monrovia 117.38 28.43 55.9 186.09 
QINV β5 - kg Inverse of the total amount of cocoa sold 0.02 0.04 0 0.5 
TRANSPORT β6 +  
=1 if farmer owns either a Bicycle, 
Moped/Motorcycle, Pickup truck or 
Automobile; else =0 
0.06 0.24 0 1 
Transportation 
BTRANS β7 +/-   =1 if the farmer transported the cocoa to the buying center; else =0 0.14 0.34 0 1 
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Table 11: Price Transmission Regression Variables Continued 
BFARM β8 +  =1 if Farmer participates in farmer organization, else =0  0.16 0.37 0 1 
MKTIN β9 +  
=1 of market information was gathered from 
newspaper, radio or government at the 
Always, Often and Sometimes level, else = 0   
0.04 0.19 0 1 
OMRKTIN β10 +  
=1 of market information gathered from 
neighbors or produce buyers at the Always, 
Often and Sometimes level, else = 0  
0.85 0.36 0 1 
NOINFO    
Control representing if the farmer obtained no 
information on cocoa     
CELL β11 +  =1 if the farmer has access to cell phone, else =0 0.05 0.23 0 1 
BCRED β12 -  =1 if the farmer obtained a loan from the buyer, else = 0  0.24 0.43 0 1 
NONBCRED β13 +  =1 if the farmer had obtained a loan but had not obtained it from a buyer, else = 0 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Market 
Information 
And 
Resources 
NOCRED 
  
    Control representing if the farmer had not obtained a loan     
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Table 12: Price Transmission Regression Variables Continued 
FAMSIZE  β14 -/+  Number of household members 6.67 3.34 1 19 
EDUC β15 +  
Number of years the main cocoa farmer in the 
household (Head of House or Spouse) attended 
school 
4.44 5.05 0 25 
CEXP β16 +  Number of years of cocoa farming experience of the head of household. 19.86 11.85 0 56 
Farm 
Characteristics 
 
CHOLD β17 -  
Importance of cocoa to household calculated 
as ratio of acres of cocoa to other tree crop 
acreage. 
0.7 0.3 0 1 
WET β18 -  
1= if sale occurred in the months of September 
or October, else = 0 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Season 
DRY 
  
  
 
Control representing if the sale did not occur 
in September or October.         
BIGCTR β19 + 
 
1= if village is located near a regional buying 
center (villages of Gbarnga, Voinjama, 
Saclepea), else = 0 
0.31 0.46 0 1 
LILCTR   
 
1= if village is located near a local buying 
center (villages of Zoweinta, Zorzor, 
Karnplay), else = 0 
    
NIMBA β20 +  
=1 if household is in Nimba County 
=0 if household is in Lofa County 
=-1 if household is in Bong County 
0.28 0.78 -1 1 
LOFA β21 -  
=1 if household is in Lofa County 
=0 if household is in Nimba County 
=-1 if household is in Bong County 
0.11 0.71 -1 1 
Location 
BONG    
=0 if household is in Lofa County 
=0 if household is in Nimba County 
=1 if household is in Bong County 
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Table 13: Distances from Villages to Buying Centers and Export Markets (In Kilometers) 
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Table 14: Management of Field Crops by Gender, Including Average and Maximum Number of Fields Per Household  
Field Crop Number of Households Women Men Both 
No 
Response 
Average 
Number of 
Fields per 
House 
Max Fields 
per 
Household 
Rice/Cassava/Mixed Food 
Crop Fallow Rotation 
245 22% 3% 75% 0% 1.09 4 
Swamp rice   103 14% 2% 80% 4% 1.10 3 
Cassava field  100 14% 14% 57% 14% 1.06 2 
Plantain field  86 14% 3% 78% 5% 1.02 2 
Pepper field  83 13% 88% 2% 0% 1.00 1 
Bitter Ball field  56 11% 4% 84% 0% 1.00 1 
Upland rice field 36 11% 5% 76% 9% 1.00 1 
Okra field  24 8% 92% 0% 0% 1.00 1 
Sweet Potato Field    7 7% 21% 71% 1% 1.00 1 
Maize field  2 0% 100% 0% 0% 1.00 1 
Eggplant field  1 0% 100% 0% 0% 1.00 1 
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Table 15: Number and Current Conditions of Tools Found in Households Surveyed 
Condition of Tools 
Item Number of Households 
Number 
of Tools Good 
(%) 
Fair 
(%) 
Poor 
(%) 
Unknown 
(%) 
Average 
Qty Per 
House 
Cutlasses/machetes 332 905 49% 40% 11% 1% 2.73 
Axes 269 432 51% 36% 13% 1% 1.61 
Hoes 286 871 45% 39% 16% 2% 3.05 
Pruning shears   14 24 42% 50% 8% 0% 1.71 
Oil press 0 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.00 
Chainsaw   0 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.00 
Knapsack sprayer   3 3 67% 0% 33% 0% 1.00 
Irrigation pump   1 1 100% 0% 0% 0% 1.00 
Cocoa harvesting poles   183 244 63% 30% 5% 4% 1.33 
Jute bags   79 183 69% 30% 1% 5% 2.32 
Tarpaulin   43 46 54% 41% 4% 4% 1.07 
Raffia drying mats   185 279 60% 33% 6% 3% 1.51 
Fermentation baskets   43 59 68% 31% 2% 0% 1.37 
Dibble planting stick   3 3 33% 33% 33% 0% 1.00 
Other 56 61 52% 28% 20% 2% 1.09 
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Table 16: Cocoa Labor Provided the Household by Age Cohort and Occupation  
 3-7 8-14 15-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61 + 
Number of Laborers 407 402 290 309 239 177 111 112 
Total Tasks 38 218 406 668 530 504 291 167 
Total Cocoa Laborers 15 135 190 236 190 155 92 54 
Average # Tasks per Person 2.53 1.61 2.14 2.83 2.79 3.25 3.16 3.09 
% of Cohort Participating in 
Cocoa Labor 3.69% 33.58% 65.52% 76.38% 79.50% 87.57% 82.88% 48.21% 
         
Principle Economic Activity for 
Household Cocoa Labor         
Self Employed Ag 0 4 53 160 177 145 88 45 
Hire Labor Ag 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Salaried Non Ag 0 0 1 0 0 4 2 1 
Retired 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Student 13 0 128 57 3 1 0 0 
Petty Commerce 0 121 1 0 2 0 0 1 
Homemaker 0 0 3 14 5 2 0 0 
Other 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 
None 2 0 4 4 3 2 1 4 
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Table 17: Quantity and Averages of Hired Labor for Cocoa by Task 
Task 
Number of 
Households 
That Hired 
Labor 
Total 
Number 
of 
Workers 
Hired28 
Average 
Wage 
($USD/hr)
Average 
Number of 
Employees 
Average 
Number 
of Hours 
per 
Employee 
Pruning 9 59 0.42 9.56 14.00 
Brushing 59 577 0.73 12.95 13.41 
Harvesting 11 203 0.80 18.45 10.13 
Drying/Fermenting 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Seasonal 13 214 69.51 20.15  
                                                 
 
28 Households may have employed the same individual for more than one task 
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Table 18: Farmgate and Port Prices for Cocoa Beans in Selected African Countries 
($US/kg)  
Price Location Main Cocoa Crop 06/07 
  Oct Nov Dec Jan 
W
or
ld
 
Pr
ic
e 
ICCO 1.53 1.58 1.70 1.70 
Nigeria - Port 1.30 1.33 1.46 1.57 
Po
rt
 P
ri
ce
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
- Port 0.72 0.78 0.87 0.92 
Liberia - Farm 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.39 
Cameroon - 
Farm 1.17 1.16 1.26 1.35 
Nigeria - Farm 1.21 1.25 1.38 1.49 
Ghana - Farm 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 Fa
rm
ga
te
 P
ri
ce
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
- Farm 0.58 0.68 0.76 0.82 
Liberia - Farm 21% 22% 22% 23% 
Cameroon - 
Farm 77% 73% 74% 79% 
Nigeria - Farm 79% 79% 81% 87% 
Ghana - Farm 63% 61% 56% 56% 
%
 o
f t
he
 IC
C
O
 P
ri
ce
 r
ec
ei
ve
d 
at
 th
e 
Fa
rm
ga
te
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
- Farm 38% 43% 45% 48% 
Source: Reuters News (2007) 
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Table 19: Quality Discount Frequency and Discount Size (in Kilograms and $USD) 
Item Nimba (n=286)
Lofa 
(n=169) 
Bong  
(n=108) 
% of Sales with Any Type of Discount 70.3% 85.8% 83.3% 
% Sales with Quality Discount 
 (Wet or Moldy) 18.9% 10.1% 5.6% 
Average  Size of Discount (kg) 3.0 2.9 2.3 
Average discount per transaction ($USD) 1.13 0.92 0.77 
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Table 20: Cocoa Drying Methods for Surveyed Households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method Percent of Households (n=336) 
Concrete Slab 1.19% 
Road  0.30% 
Bamboo mats 69.94% 
Tarp 8.33% 
Attic with fire 0.89% 
Raised platform with mat 0.30% 
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Table 21: Cost ($USD) of a Taxi Ride to Monrovia from the Buying Centers 
Buying Center N Mean29 Min Max Std 
Bahn 72 11.42 0.12 16.67 3.33 
Gbarnga 157 6.29 4.17 10.00 1.54 
Karnplay 81 13.60 1.67 29.17 4.33 
Saclepea 62 12.06 0.15 25.00 3.91 
Voinjama 118 19.35 11.67 25.00 3.45 
Zorzor 183 12.19 8.33 25.00 2.45 
Zoweinta 113 11.49 6.67 25.00 4.24 
                                                 
 
29 Using the Law of Averages as justification, these figures were calculated using responses from the entire 
survey population 
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Table 22: Variable Means and Standard Deviations for Effective Farmgate Price Determination Model by County 
  Bong n=108 Lofa n=171 Nimba n=206 Sample n=532 
 Units Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Error 
PRICED $USD 0.33 0 0.31 0 0.37 0.01 0.34 0.09 
LIFFE $/Kilogram 1.67 0.01 1.67 0.01 1.66 0.01 1.67 0.08 
QUALMAT Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.30 0.04 0.29 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.25 0.44 
TGDIST Kilometer 57.17 2.60 57.82 1.37 78.41 0.98 67.52 21.90 
TMDIST Kilometer 87.17 2.60 103.09 0.95 139.28 1.01 117.38 28.44 
QINV Kilogram 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.03 0 0.02 0.04 
TRANSPORT Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.25 
BTRANS Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.34 
BFARM Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.28 0.03 0.16 0.37 
MKTIN Dummy Variable (0,1) 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.19 
OMKTIN Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.94 0.02 0.91 0.02 0.76 0.03 0.85 0.36 
CELL Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.03 0.02 0 0 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.23 
BCRED Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.06 0.02 0.23 0.03 0.33 0.03 0.24 0.43 
NONBCRED Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.18 
FAMSIZE People 5.23 0.17 5.42 0.14 8.09 0.25 6.66 3.29 
EDUC Years 4.14 0.42 2.80 0.32 5.65 0.34 4.44 5.05 
CEXP Years 20.40 1.20 18.57 0.87 20.36 0.74 19.86 11.85 
CHOLD Percentage 0.72 0.03 0.77 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.70 0.30 
WET Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.03 0.40 0.03 0.29 0.45 
BIGCTR Dummy Variable (0,1) 0.56 0.05 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.31 0.47 
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Table 23: Estimates for the Effective Farmgate Price Determination Model 
Variablei Parameter Estimates ii T-Stat Elasticitiesiii 
INTERCEPT 0.161   
LIFFE 0.146*** 2.840 0.704 
QUALMAT -0.023*** -2.841  
TGDIST -0.002*** -4.389 -0.350 
TMDIST 0.001*** 2.867 0.322 
QINV 0.189 1.043 0.012 
TRANSPORT -0.025 -1.418  
BTRANS 0.016 1.608  
BFARM 0.024* 1.714  
MKTIN 0.036 0.885  
OMRKTIN -0.017* -1.693  
CELL -0.021 -1.262  
BCRED -0.021** -2.151  
NONBCRED 0.007 0.250  
FAMILYSIZE -0.001 -0.386 -0.010 
EDUC 0.000 -0.374 -0.004 
CEXP 0.000 -1.119 -0.019 
CHOLD -0.005 -0.325 -0.009 
WET -0.034*** -3.752  
BIGCTR -0.041*** -3.321  
NIMBA 0.028*** 3.047  
LOFA -0.033*** -7.071  
    
N 532   
DF 511   
Adjusted R2 0.1997   
                                                 
 
i Variables are defined in tables Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12. 
ii Critical t-value for ***1%, **5%, *10% is 2.585, 1.964, and 1.647 respectively. 
iii Elasticities were not calculated for the discrete variables. 
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Source: Gilbert (1997), Geene, Heijbroek, and Lagerwerf. (2000) and Wilcox (2006) 
 
Figure 1: General Cocoa Marketing Chain
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Figure 2: 2006/07 Average Cocoa Prices for Selected West African Countries and the LIFFE Price 
Source: Reuters News (2007)
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Source: Wilcox, English and Davies (2007) 
 
Figure 3: General Schematic of Current Liberian Smallholder Cocoa Marketing 
Chain  
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Figure 4: Frequency Distribution of Household Size for Households Producing and 
Marketing Cocoa in 2006/07 season 
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Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of Household Members by Family Status and Age 
Cohort (n=2047) 
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Figure 6: Educational Experience Levels for Household Members by Age Cohort 
 
 
 122
66.05%
0.08%
0.73%
24.17%
0.73%
2.99%
0.73%
0.16%
4.37%
Self Employed Ag
Hire Labor Ag
Salaried Non Ag
Retired
Student
Petty Commerce
Homemaker
Other
None
 
 
Figure 7: Economic Activity of Surveyed Household Members Over Age 14 
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Figure 8: Sources of Household Income (n=332 Households) 
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Figure 9: Tree Cropping Systems for Households Surveyed (n=657 farms) 
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Figure 10: Secondary Tree Crops Planted with Cocoa (n=387) 
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Figure 11: Importance of Agricultural Product, by Gender, Produced By Producing 
and Marketing Cocoa Household (n=332) 
 127
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 49 52 59
Age (years)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Bong
Lofa
Nimba
 
Figure 12: Age of Cocoa Tree Stock for Households that Producing and Marketed 
Cocoa in 2006/07 season by County 
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Figure 13: Current Status of Cocoa Farms Producing and Marketing Cocoa 
Households (n=339) 
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Figure 14: Future Plans for Abandoned Cocoa Farms for All Survey Respondents 
(n=102)  
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Figure 15: Principal Type of Labor for Tree Crops in Producing and Marketing 
Cocoa Households (n=332)
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Figure 16: Cocoa Farming Labor Input of Household Members by Age Cohort and 
Gender for Cocoa Producing and Marketing Households (n=332)
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Figure 17: Average Monthly Prices Received by Surveyed Households, Weighted by 
Quantity Sold, by County Compared to LIFFE Price 
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500+ kg         0.18%  (n=1) 
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Figure 18: Percentage of Sales Transactions per Month by Quantity  
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Figure 19: Sources of Credit for Cocoa Farming Received by Households 
that Producing and Marketed Cocoa in 2006/07
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Source: ReliefWeb (2007) - Humanitarian Information Centre for Liberia (HIC-LBR)  
 
Figure 20: Status of Roads in Liberia 2006
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Figure 21: Sources of Market Information for Cocoa (n=19) 
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Appendix B. Baseline Survey 
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Appendix C. Village Survey 
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